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TRACKING THE CONSTITUTION—THE PROLIFERATION
AND LEGALITY OF SEX-OFFENDER GPS-TRACKING
STATUTES
*

Eric M. Dante

I.

INTRODUCTION

If the 1990s can reasonably be referred to as the “registration
1
decade” with regard to sex-offender statutes, then the first decade of
the twenty-first century could accurately be considered the “tracking
decade.” Since 2005, an increasing number of states have expanded
their registration programs to allow for various degrees of electronic
monitoring of sex offenders to deal with the dangers that post2
incarceration sex offenders pose to their communities. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, “Sex offenders are a serious
3
threat in this Nation.” At least as far as the Court is concerned, there
is no doubt that sex offenders, once released back into our communities, pose a significant danger of recommitting the crimes that led to
4
their incarceration in the first place. Especially when dealing with
sexual predators who target children, the public seems to want noth5
ing more than to “lock ‘em up and throw away the key.”
The trend in the law has been to place sex offenders into a form
of “internal exile” upon release from prison, restricting their rights in

*

J.D., 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Kean University. I
would like to thank Professor Alice Ristroph and Daniel McGrady for their guidance
throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank my wife, my family, and
my friends for their unwavering support.
1
See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006) (requiring all states to establish a program to register and track sex offenders).
2
Ian Friedman et al., Sexual Offenders: How to Create a More Deliberative Sentencing
Dec.
2009,
at
12,
17,
available
at
Process,
CHAMPION,
http://www.iannfriedman.com/?/ianf/articles_detail/creating_a_more_deliberative
_sentencing_process_for_sex_offenders/.
3
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (quoting McKune v.
Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (plurality opinion)).
4
Id.
5
Friedman et al., supra note 2, at 12.
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6

various ways “that exclude them from major aspects of society.” The
use of global positioning system (GPS) tracking on post-incarceration
sex offenders is the latest manifestation of this internal exile, allowing
the government to know where an offender is at all times. Yet, there
are privacy issues and other limitations inherent in the use of GPS
tracking of sex offenders that undoubtedly lead to an invasion of
their individual rights and are much more intrusive than registration
7
alone. Unlike registration requirements, which render a sex offender’s status openly available only to those people searching for it, an
external GPS device on an offender’s ankle or belt can reveal this in8
formation to the public wherever the offender goes.
The U.S. Supreme Court has already affirmed the constitutional9
ity of registration requirements, but the constitutionality of this new
plethora of sex-offender tracking statutes has yet to be tested. The
Court upheld registration requirements as a “civil regulatory scheme”
to notify the public about the threat of sex-offender recidivism and
10
not as a punitive measure, but GPS tracking is much more restrictive. This Comment seeks to restore the balance between the rights
of the individual sex offender and the security interest of society by
examining the arguments on both sides of the issue and ultimately
proposing a model statute that would survive constitutional review.
The proliferation of GPS-tracking statutes started out the same
11
way as most sex-offender legislation: a horrible crime was committed

6
Nora v. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 153 (1999).
7
See Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196–97 (Mass. 2009) (explaining
that a lifetime GPS-tracking requirement is “dramatically more intrusive and burdensome” than registration only).
8
See Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1011–12 (6th Cir. 2007) (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that wearing a “relatively large satellite monitoring device[]” is similar to having a police escort following the offender
wherever he goes and acts as “a modern day scarlet letter” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
9
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that Alaska’s sex offender registration law is non-punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the
U.S. Constitution); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2003) (holding that Connecticut’s sex offender law does not violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment even if registration does cause injury to reputation).
10
Smith, 538 U.S. at 105–06.
11
See Whitman Latest to Urge Laws on Notices of Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1994, at 24 (describing the push for Megan’s Law after the rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka by a convicted sex offender); Editorial, Keeping Track of
Child Molesters, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 6, 1994, at A10 (describing the push for the
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children Registration Act (Jacob Wetterling Act)
after the kidnapping of 11-year-old Jacob Wetterling).
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against a child and prompted legislators to take action. Jessica Lunsford, a name that is associated with many of these statutes, was a nineyear-old girl in Homosassa, Florida, who was kidnapped, raped, and
13
murdered by a registered sex offender in 2005. Even though her
murderer was a registered sex offender who had been jailed previously for four years for exhibiting indecent behavior in front of a kindergartener, he was still able to get a job working at Jessica’s school on a
14
construction project. His criminal record was never checked, and
that gave him the opportunity to victimize Jessica, ultimately burying
her under his motor home only 150 yards away from Jessica’s parents’
15
home.
The Jessica Lunsford case created a public outcry that registration for post-incarceration sex offenders was not enough; in response,
Florida State Representative Charles Dean drafted the original “Jessica Lunsford Act” to allow real-time tracking by GPS of violent sex of16
fenders. A few different variations of this initial statute have been
written, and this Comment will not be limited to the original statute;
rather it will focus on the developing body of law across the nation as
17
a whole. These new statutes are merely part of the increasingly
harsh treatment that sex offenders face when they finish their prison
18
sentences, and one question that has yet to be asked is whether forcing a sex offender to wear a tracking device for decades, or even for
19
the rest of his life, goes too far.
This Comment will examine the broad array of sex-offender
tracking statutes and the question of whether such laws would survive
12

See Mark Memmott, Girl’s Death Raises Questions About Tracking of Sex Offenders,
USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 2005, at 4A.
13
Mark Memmott, Girl’s Death Raises Questions About Tracking of Sex Offenders, USA
TODAY, Mar. 25, 2005, at 4A.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Please note that this Comment will focus on the effect that such statutes have
on post-incarceration sex offenders who have already served their time in prison and
have been forced to wear a GPS tracking device after their release back into society.
There are additional situations, such as house arrest prior to trial as a condition of
bail, that may also lead to the utilization of GPS-tracking or similar technologies, but
such situations are outside of the scope of this Comment.
18
See Isaac B. Rosenberg, Involuntary Endogenous RFID Compliance Monitoring as a
Condition of Federal Supervised Release—Chips Ahoy?, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 331, 334
(2008) (“Sex offenders are the foremost targets of our nation’s punitive zeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19
Please note that this Comment will use male pronouns, but this in no way indicates that all sex offenders are male or that the GPS-tracking statutes could not
equally apply to female offenders.

DANTE_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/24/2012 10:51 AM

1172

[Vol. 42:1169

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Supreme Court scrutiny if their constitutionality is challenged. Part
II will review the various statutory models, providing a general survey
of which states have such electronic-monitoring capability and how
slight differences in statutory wording or construction can have a
large constitutional impact. Part III will provide an overview of the
various arguments against the constitutionality of GPS-tracking statutes and the numerous ways in which these statutes restrict sex offenders’ rights. Part IV will examine the constitutional arguments of
the opposing side, which tends to view such restrictions as reasonable
limitations on the rights of sexual predators. Part V will deliver this
Comment’s findings and propose several ways in which the various
states can amend their current statutes in order for these statutes to
survive constitutional challenges. For example, such statutes should
(1) be based on an individualized risk assessment, (2) should not be
applied retroactively, and (3) should not provide usable evidence
when an offender is within a protected area. Lastly, Part VI will propose a model statute that would be likely pass constitutional review.
II. STATUTORY MODELS
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia allow some form of
electronic monitoring of sex offenders, but the laws vary greatly as to
20
how they are written and applied. Even though there are a few distinct models that can be used to group together similar states, there
are also states that have gone in different directions from the Florida
21
Model, the California Model, or the Massachusetts Model. Florida,
22
23
California, and Massachusetts are considered the main statutory
models for this Comment because they were the first three states to
enact a detailed statutory scheme for sex-offender GPS tracking and
because many states follow these models. A few states, however, have
24
departed from these three main approaches. In addition, there has
25
been some federal action in this area of law, and there are still nine
states where sex offenders are tracked solely through the registration
26
laws in force. Part II is a survey of the laws’ similarities, differences,
and approaches to various problems that post-incarceration sex offenders pose.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

See discussion infra Parts II.A–D.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
See discussion infra Part II.D.
See discussion infra Part II.E.
See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
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A. The Florida Model
On May 2, 2005, the Florida governor approved the original
statute drafted by Representative Dean, dubbed the “Jessica Lunsford
27
Act,” less than three months after Jessica originally went missing. In
response to the public perception that registration alone was not
enough to prevent sexual predators from committing heinous crimes,
the new statute required heightened “community control” supervi28
sion for those sex offenders who were deemed a threat. The Act required the Department of Corrections to develop a “graduated risk
assessment” to identify those sex offenders who pose a heightened
29
risk of recidivism by December 1, 2005.
The law imposed different treatment for violent sex offenders
30
depending on the date that the crime was committed. If the of31
fender committed any one of specific crimes on or after October 1,
1997, but prior to September 1, 2005, it was within the court’s discre32
tion whether to submit him to electronic monitoring. For any offender who committed those same crimes on or after September 1,
2005, however, the court was required to order “mandatory electronic
monitoring as a condition of the probation or community-control su33
pervision.” For certain sex offenders who preyed on children, the
court was no longer allowed to impose leniency because the state was
now required to know where they were at any moment while under
34
community supervision.
Although the Florida statute was very clear that mandatory tracking was required only for offenses committed after the statute’s effective date, the legislature enacted another statute at the same time to
bring a significant number of sex offenders whose crimes were committed prior to September 1, 2005, within the electronic-monitoring
27

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30 (LexisNexis 2010) (effective Sept. 1, 2005).
Id. § 948.061.
29
Id. § 948.061(1).
30
Id. § 948.30(2).
31
Id. §§ 800.04, 827.071, 847.0135(5), 847.0145 (allowing the use of postincarceration GPS tracking for the following offenses: “Lewd or lascivious offenses
committed upon or in the presence of persons less than 16 years of age,” “sexual performance by a child,” prohibited “computer transmissions” with a child, and the
“selling or buying of minors”). In comparison with other states like California, see
discussion infra Part II.B, the Florida law limits GPS tracking to very few crimes focusing exclusively on the abuse or exploitation of minors.
32
Id. § 948.30(2) (emphasis added).
33
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(3) (LexisNexis 2010) (emphasis added).
34
See id. § 948.11(6) (requiring “a system that actively monitors and identifies the
offender’s location”).
28

DANTE_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/24/2012 10:51 AM

1174

[Vol. 42:1169

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

mandate if they committed any violation of their probation or pa35
role. In State v. Petrae, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District
found that the trial court was required to order electronic monitoring of an offender who committed “lewd or lascivious battery” by having sex with a thirteen-year-old girl in November 2003 and then vio36
lated his probation in 2006. The court pointed out the irony in the
fact that it would be within the trial court’s authority to end the probation altogether, but while the probation was in effect, the court had
no discretion to modify the electronic-monitoring mandate for pro37
bation violators.
This wide net for probation violations does not need to be triggered by a new sex offense. A court may impose mandatory electronic monitoring even if a person previously designated as a “sexual
predator” commits a probation violation that has nothing to do with
38
the aforementioned sexual offenses. In State v. Lacayo, the offender
39
was designated a sexual predator in 1999 but violated probation by
fleeing a police officer in 2005, a violation that the trial court did not
40
believe could trigger electronic monitoring. The appeals court reversed, holding that any probation violation for a person previously
designated to be a sexual predator, whether the probation violation
was sexual or not, was enough to trigger mandatory electronic moni41
toring.
Fields v. State yielded a similar result in a situation where the offender had committed her crime in 1999 and then violated her subsequent probation by driving habitually with a suspended license in
42
2006. Even though the probation violation had nothing to do with
her original offense and was not even remotely sexual in nature, the
43
courts were required to grant the motion for electronic monitoring.
There is no room for judicial discretion once a sex offender who has
committed in the past one of the enumerated crimes violates probation in any way, and this wide net is being used to justify the GPS
tracking of many sex offenders regardless of how long ago they com35

Id. § 948.063.
35 So. 3d 1012, 1013–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
37
Id. at 1014 n.2.
38
8 So. 3d 385, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
39
Id. at 386 (receiving this designation—“following his convictions for lewd and
lascivious assault on a child and for sexual battery on a helpless victim”).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 387.
42
968 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
43
Id. at 1033–34.
36
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mitted their crime. This retroactivity was built into the Florida Mod44
el, and the state is very quick to use it at the earliest opportunity.
In other cases, the courts have not yielded to the state’s rush to
sweep prior offenders into the mandatory electronic monitoring program under the probation-violation exception. In Bell v. State, an offender was accused of violating a condition that the probation officer
had added after the original court-ordered probation was set up, immediately pushing the state to file a request for mandatory electronic
45
monitoring. The court held that the officer was not allowed to impose additional conditions and then attempt to move for electronic
monitoring when the offender had not violated any of the court’s
46
conditions for probation. Bell is a good example of the state’s readiness to pursue electronic monitoring for sex offenders who trip up
on their probation without any judicial discretion to protect the offender’s interests.
Courts have shown ample confusion in the application of the
Florida sex-offender-tracking statutes, and this confusion does not always stem from a court trying to use discretion where mandatory electronic monitoring is required. On a number of occasions, trial courts
have been under the impression that electronic monitoring was
47
mandatory in cases in which it was actually discretionary. This has
led appeals courts to repeatedly insist on an individual assessment of
an offender’s risk to the community if his crime was committed be48
fore September 1, 2005. In Burrell v. State, for example, the offender
committed lewd battery on a child in 2002, prior to the effective date
49
of the Jessica Lunsford Act. Even though the Department of Corrections and the courts had discretion to decide whether Burrell required electronic monitoring, the trial court imposed monitoring
without any risk assessment, mistakenly assuming that it was manda50
tory under Florida Criminal Code section 984.30. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, holding that where the statute gives the
courts discretion, the offender deserves an individual assessment of

44

See, e.g., Lacayo, 8 So. 3d at 387; Fields, 968 So. 2d at 1033.
24 So. 3d 712, 713–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
46
Id. at 714.
47
See, e.g., Burrell v. State, 993 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“However, in this case, the trial court was under the mistaken impression that it was required to impose the electronic monitoring under the Act. The court stated at the
hearing that the proposed reinstatement of probation ‘is a GPS mandatory.’”).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
45
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51

whether electronic monitoring is required. For anyone who committed the applicable crime on or after September 1, 2005, however,
no individualized review is required; the court must impose electron52
ic monitoring for the term of the offender’s probation.
Fourteen states have adopted the Florida Model, requiring electronic monitoring when an offender who committed an enumerated
53
crime is on probation after incarceration. Each of these states enacted some form of mandatory electronic monitoring for sex offenders on probation, but there are subtle differences. For example, Alabama’s statute is very close to the Florida statute, requiring anyone
adjudicated to be a “sexually violent predator” to be subject to elec54
tronic monitoring.
Alabama actually goes one step further than
Florida, though, not only requiring anyone who commits certain
crimes to automatically be electronically monitored upon release
from incarceration but also mandating that such electronic monitoring be in effect for a minimum of ten years, a specification that Flori55
da did not enact. Although differences exist, the statutes of these
fourteen states are similar enough to the original Jessica’s Law to fall
under the larger categorization of the Florida Model.
The Florida Model, which requires electronic monitoring during
the probation period based not upon the individual’s threat of
reoffending but on the crime committed, is the most prevalent form
of sex-offender electronic-monitoring statutory model. This is likely
due to the fact that the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
56
of 2006, a federal law providing state grants for sex-offender elec-

51

Id. at 1000.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(3) (LexisNexis 2010).
53
ALA. CODE § 15-20-26.1 (LexisNexis 2010) (effective Sept. 1, 2006); ALASKA
STAT. § 12.55.100 (f) (2010) (effective Sept. 23, 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-902(G)
(LexisNexis 2010) (effective June 21, 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4121(u) (2010)
(effective May 17, 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8308(3), 20-219(2) (2010) (effective
July 1, 2009); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8A-6 (LexisNexis 2010) (effective July 1,
2007); IOWA CODE § 692A.124(1) (2010) (effective May 21, 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:560.4(A) (2010) (effective Aug. 15, 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-206 (2010)
(effective July 1, 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10.1(E) (LexisNexis 2010) (effective
July 1, 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-540 (2010) (effective July 1, 2006); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 23A-27-12.1, 24-15A-24 (2010) (effective Mar. 7, 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2303 (2010) (effective July 1, 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-11D-3(a) (LexisNexis
2006) (effective Oct. 1, 2006).
54
ALA. CODE § 15-20-26.1 (LexisNexis 2010).
55
Id. § 15-20-26.1(c).
56
42 U.S.C. § 16981 (2006) (effective Oct. 1, 2006).
52
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tronic-monitoring programs that meet minimum requirements, was
57
modeled after the Florida statute.
B. The California Model
One of the harshest statutory models enacted thus far is the California sex offender tracking statute. Known as the Sexual Predator
Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law (SPPCA), the statute was
58
approved by California voters as Proposition 83 in 2006. Governor
Schwarzenegger then approved the SPPCA on September 20, 2006,
and the sections which were deemed to be “urgent” went into effect
immediately while the “[n]on-urgen[t]” provisions went into effect
59
on January 1, 2007. A clear illustration of the punitive effect that
the SPPCA was meant to have on sex offenders is evident from the
bill’s name on the ballot initiative: Sex Offenders. Sexually Violent
Predators. Punishment, Residence Restrictions and Monitoring. Initia60
tive Statute.
The bill required the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to assess “every eligible person who is incarcerated or on parole
for the risk of reoffending” by using the State-Authorized Risk As61
sessment Tool for Sex Offenders (SARATSO).” The enacted statute
mandated lifetime electronic monitoring by GPS for any offender
who committed certain offenses, without any reference to the date
62
that the offense was actually committed. Unlike the Florida Model,
which is very specific as to the date ranges within which discretionary
63
and mandatory electronic monitoring is triggered, the California
Model makes no mention of any retroactive application, and leaves it
to the courts to decipher legislative intent.
The mandatory lifetime GPS monitoring applies to anyone convicted in any jurisdiction of a much broader list of offenses as soon as
64
he is released on parole. Needless to say, the California Model is
57

See discussion infra Part II.E.2.
People v. Milligan, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
59
2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 336 (West).
60
2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 83 (West)(emphasis added).
61
2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 336 (West).
62
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004 (Deering 2010) (effective Nov. 8, 2006).
63
See supra notes 30, 32–33 and accompanying text.
64
The commission of the following offenses requires post-incarceration GPStracking: murder “committed in the perpetration, or an attempt to perpetrate, rape,”
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(c) (Deering 2010), sodomy, Id. § 286, lewd or lascivious acts,
Id. § 288, oral copulation involving children, Id. § 288(a), penetration by a foreign
object involving children, Id. § 289, kidnapping, Id. § 207, “kidnapping for gain or to
commit robbery or rape,” Id. § 209, if the intent was to violate any of the previously
58
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much broader than the Florida Model, encompassing many more
criminal acts. While the Florida Model allows court discretion for
66
acts committed prior to September 1, 2005, the California Model
removes all judicial discretion from the equation, mandating GPS
67
monitoring for life for a much broader list of offenses. In essence,
since section 290(c) of the California Penal Code applies to any convictions since July 1, 1944, courts could have interpreted section
3004(b), as written, to require lifetime GPS tracking of someone who
was incarcerated for making a lewd telephone call to a minor in
68
1944. In addition, the offender being tracked is required to pay for
any costs associated with his monitoring by the Department of Cor69
rections and Rehabilitation. This is the broadest and harshest of the
sex-offender statutory models.
The California legislators initially left open the possibility of the
GPS-tracking requirement applying to crimes committed at the end
of World War II, but the California courts have since closed off any
70
possibility of retroactive application. In People v. Milligan, an offender was originally required to register in 1987 and challenged additional conditions placed on him retroactively as violating the ex
post facto provisions in the United States and the California Constitu71
tions. The court made a clear distinction between statutory provisions that were punitive in nature and those that were “a regulatory
72
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive.” Although the court found
that DNA sampling and registration requirements were not punitive
listed sections plus “[r]ape, duress, or menace,” Id. § 261, voluntarily aiding or abetting a person in committing these acts, Id. § 264.1, “[a]ssault with intent to commit
mayhem or specified sex offenses, Id. § 220, [a]ssault of a person under 18 years of
age with intent to commit specified sex offenses,” Id., excluding “assault to commit
mayhem,” Id. § 243.3, various aforementioned offenses involving the use of force or
violence, Id. § 290(c), “any offense involving lewd or lascivious conduct,” Id., while
“contributing to delinquency of [a] minor,” or “[l]uring [a] minor under 14 away
from home,” Id. § 272, or any felony violation involving the sending of “harmful matter to [a] minor by telephone messages, electronic mail, Internet, or commercial
online service,” Id. § 288.2. In addition, the statute covers “any statutory predecessor
that includes all elements” of any of the enumerated penal code sections, or conspiracy to commit any of the listed offenses. Id. § 290(c).
65
See supra notes 30, 32–33 and accompanying text.
66
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67
Id. § 3004(c).
68
See supra note 64.
69
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004 (c) (Deering 2010).
70
Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181–82 (E.D. Cal. 2007); People v. Milligan, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
71
Milligan, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 553–54.
72
Id. at 555 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)).
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in nature, the court did not address the issue whether the GPStracking requirement was punitive because the Attorney General
conceded that the law only operated prospectively and not retroac73
tively, which made the point moot.
A similar case attacking the statute’s retroactive application, Doe
v. Schwarzenegger was a multiple-plaintiff case in which various sex offenders challenged the constitutionality of the state’s attempt to ap74
ply the SPPCA retroactively on the same grounds as in Milligan.
One plaintiff, referred to as “John Doe I,” had originally committed a
crime requiring registration twenty years earlier and was later jailed
75
and paroled for not following the registration requirements. After
his release, he obtained approval from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to live at a location that was within 2,000 feet
of several neighborhood parks, which was not a crime until the
SPPCA imposed harsh residency requirements along with the GPS76
tracking requirement.
In October 2006, when Proposition 83
seemed likely to pass, he received a letter mandating that he move
77
away from the parks to comply with the new statute. The other two
“John Does” were in similar circumstances, which required them to
leave their homes because of the state’s attempt to apply the SPPCA
78
retroactively. The district court found that the SPPCA could not
apply retroactively because the statute did not expressly state the legislature’s intent that it be applied not solely prospectively, and therefore, the plaintiffs were not required to move in order to comply with
79
the new law. Even though the courts have definitively held that the
California statute only applies prospectively, it is still the strictest of
the sex-offender tracking-statute models passed in the last decade.
Seven states have endorsed the California Model and mandate
80
lifetime electronic monitoring for various classes of sex offenders.

73

Id. at 554.
Doe, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178.
75
Id. at 1179.
76
Id. at 1179–80.
77
Id. at 1180.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1181–82.
80
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14(e) (2011) (effective July 1, 2006); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 11-723(c)(1)(i), (d)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) (effective Apr. 13, 2010);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520n(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (effective May 30, 2006);
MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735 (2011) (effective June 5, 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40,
208.40A(c) (2011) (effective Dec. 1, 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-8.2.1 (2009) (effective June 28, 2006); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2011) (effective July 1, 2007).
74
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As with the Florida Model, while this category does encompass those
states that require mandatory lifetime monitoring of certain sex offenders, there are differences beyond this core similarity. For example, in Georgia there is a slight difference with the California Model
in that there is an individual assessment for how likely it is that the offender will strike another child, but once a person is deemed a “sexually dangerous predator,” he is required to wear a GPS tracking de82
vice for the rest of his natural life.
In Maryland, a sex-offender-tracking statute similar to the California Model applies to various crimes committed on or after Octo83
ber 1, 2010. Even though there is no specific date of applicability in
the California Model, the Maryland statute can accurately be included under the California Model category because it requires lifetime
GPS monitoring based on the crime committed, not the specific indi84
vidualized threat of recidivism. Michigan adopted the California
Model but focused on the age of the offender and the victim, triggering lifetime electronic monitoring if certain crimes are committed
when the offender is at least seventeen and the victim is less than thir85
teen. Missouri requires lifetime monitoring for offenders who have
86
committed certain crimes but adds a unique provision that allows a
court to terminate lifetime electronic monitoring when the offender
87
has reached the age of sixty-five. Even with these differences, the
California Model is the second most prevalent statutory scheme, likely because the harsher requirements are more popular with a public
who, as stated before, wants to “lock [sex offenders] up and throw
88
away the key.”
C. The Massachusetts Model
A third main model of sex-offender-tracking statutes is the Massachusetts Model, which allows judicial discretion when determining
an individual’s length of probation, but then requires GPS tracking
89
for the entire probationary period for certain sexual crimes. The
original bill made sweeping changes to Massachusetts’s laws regard81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14(e) (2011).
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-723(c)(1)(i), (d)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011).
Id. § 11-723(a).
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520n(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735 (2011).
Id. § 559.106(4).
Friedman, supra note 2, at 12.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 47 (2011) (effective Dec. 20, 2006).
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ing sex-offender monitoring and punishments and was approved on
September 21, 2006, the day after the California statute was signed
90
into law. Under Massachusetts law, a sex-offender registry board was
91
created to keep track of any sex-offender registry information, main92
tain compliance with the requirements of the Jacob Wetterling Act,
and classify the public threat that each sex offender poses to the
93
community. The board is required to classify each sex offender on a
94
scale ranging from level one offenders (“risk of reoffense is low”) up
95
to level three offenders (“risk of reoffense is high”). The board then
works with the sentencing court to determine the appropriate proba96
tionary period for the individual offender, an element of judicial
97
discretion that is lacking in the California Model.
The sex-offender tracking statute then applies as a mandatory
condition of probation to offenders who committed an enumerated
98
99
crime. Similarly to the scope of the California Model, this is a
90

2006 Mass. Legis. Serv. 303 (West).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178D (2011).
92
42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).
93
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178L (2011).
94
Id. § 178K(2)(a).
95
Id. § 178K(2)(c).
96
Id. § 178K(1).
97
See discussion supra Part II.B.
98
The commission of the following offenses required GPS-tracking during the
probationary period, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (2011): “indecent assault and
battery on a child under 14,” MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13B (2011); “indecent assault and battery on a mentally retarded person,” Id. § 13F, “indecent assault and battery on a person age 14 or over,” Id. § 13H, rape, Id. § 22, “rape of a child under 16
with force,” Id. § 22A, “rape and abuse of a child,” Id. § 23, “assault with intent to
commit rape,” MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 24 (2011), “assault of a child with intent to
commit rape,” Id. § 24B, “kidnapping of a child,” Id. § 26, “enticing a child under the
age of 16 for the purposes of committing a crime,” Id. § 26C, “enticing away a person
for prostitution or sexual intercourse,” MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 2 (2011), “drugging persons for sexual intercourse,” Id. § 3, “inducing a minor into prostitution,” Id.
§ 4A; “living off or sharing earnings of a minor prostitute,” Id. § 4B, “second and subsequent adjudication or conviction for open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior,” Id. § 16, “incestuous marriage or intercourse,” Id. § 17, “disseminating to a minor matter harmful to a minor,” Id. § 28, “posing or exhibiting a child in a state of
nudity,” Id. § 29A, “dissemination of visual material of a child in a state of nudity or
sexual conduct,” Id. § 29B, “possession of child pornography,” Id. § 29C, “unnatural
or lascivious acts with a child under 16,” Id. § 35A, “aggravated rape,” MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 277, § 39 (2011), any of the aforementioned offenses involving a child,
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (2011), any of the aforementioned offenses that is
categorized as a “sexually violent offense” under Massachusetts law, Id., and any attempt to commit any of the enumerated sex offenses or a “like violation” under another jurisdiction’s laws, Id.
99
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
91
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broad category of crimes, some of which do not involve any physical
contact with a child, but any of the offenses that require a period of
probation or community supervision as decided by the sentencing
100
board also mandate a GPS tracker for the probationary period. In
addition, the probationer must pay “[t]he fees incurred by installing,
maintaining and operating the global positioning system device, or
101
comparable device.”
Aside from helping to determine the necessary period of probation, the sex-offender registry board must also determine the “defined geographic exclusion zones including, but not limited to, the
areas in and around the victim’s residence, place of employment and
school and other areas defined to minimize the probationer’s contact
102
with children, if applicable.” If the tracked offender enters any of
the excluded zones, the police is notified and the offender is arrest103
ed.
This is a unique specification in the Massachusetts statute because the Florida and the California Models do not specify how the
transmitted tracking data will be used.
Unlike the California Model which mandates lifetime tracking
based on the crime committed, under the Massachusetts Model, the
judiciary has discretion regarding the length of the probationary pe104
riod, which is determined on an individualized basis. But, such discretion evaporates if the offender fails to comply with his sex-offender
105
Similar to Florida’s probation-violation
registration requirements.
106
provision, the Massachusetts registration-violation provision mandates “community parole supervision” for life, depending on the offense originally committed and the number of times the offender has
107
violated his registration requirements.
Anyone placed on lifetime
parole must also wear a GPS device “for the length of his parole,”
which has the same effect as mandating lifetime GPS tracking for an
offender who violates his registration requirements, even though it is
108
split into two different statutes.
The judicial discretion to control
the period of probation is thus nullified if the sex offender does not

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 47 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178H (2011).
See supra notes 35–46 and accompanying text.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178H (2011).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 133D1/2 (2011).
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comply with his registration requirements under the Massachusetts
Model.
Unlike the Florida and the California Models, which base their
109
application on the date on which the crime was committed, the
courts have interpreted the Massachusetts statute to focus on the date
on which the probation was sentenced, which makes the actual date
110
of the crime irrelevant. In Commonwealth v. Cory, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts read the phrase “is placed on proba111
tion” strictly and held that, even if the crime was committed prior to
the effective date of the statute, it was the date on which the offender
112
This interpretation
was placed on probation that was important.
brings more sex offenders within the ambit of the statute because
sometimes there can be a long period of time between the actual
commission of a crime and the imposition of probation or parole as a
result of that crime. For example, even if an applicable crime was
committed in 1990, if probation was not imposed until December 21,
2006, the day after the tracking statute went into effect, the offender
would be required to wear the GPS tracker for at least the probationary period, but possibly for the rest of his life.
The Massachusetts courts have also been much more ready to
accept the true punitive nature of GPS sex-offender tracking than
113
other courts. In the court’s opinion, the physically attachment of a
GPS device to a person’s body’ was a “serious, affirmative restraint”
on the wearer especially because it has to remain attached for years
114
and may not be tampered with.
In addition, the court found that
the continuous tracking data that the GPS device releases is “an af115
firmative burden on liberty.” Although the issue in Cory was whether or not the probationary GPS-tracking requirement could be ap109
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(2) (LexisNexis 2011); see People v. Milligan, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 550, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that in California the court’s interpretation focuses on whether the crime was permitted before the effective date
when any indication of retroactive application is not present in the statute).
110
See Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 191 (Mass. 2009).
111
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 47 (2010).
112
Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 191 n.6.
113
Compare id. at 196–97 (stating that a lifetime GPS-tracking requirement is
“dramatically more intrusive and burdensome” when compared to registration only),
with State v. Bowditch, No. 448PA09, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 741, at *30–31 (N.C. May 10,
2010) (finding that a GPS-tracking requirement, while having an impact on the offender, is not a criminal punishment when compared to disbarment or postincarceration involuntary confinement because offenders are still allowed “to choose
where they work and what type of occupation they pursue”).
114
Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 196–97.
115
Id.
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plied retroactively, the case is instructive because the court held that
the forced wearing of a GPS tracking device on its own was restrictive
on the offender’s liberty when the Massachusetts tracking laws can
require GPS tracking for the rest of an offender’s natural life under
116
certain circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Thissell is a good example of the various inci117
dental ways that GPS tracking devices reduce the wearer’s rights. In
Thissell, the offender was placed on probation in 2004 for various as118
saults on his wife. He violated his probation by contacting his wife
while he was in prison in 2005, which resulted in an additional proba119
tionary condition of GPS monitoring. In 2007, a bench warrant was
issued for the offender because he went to the beach and submerged
120
the GPS device when swimming in the ocean. The electronic monitoring system used in Massachusetts “consists of two pieces of electronic equipment: an ankle bracelet, which is permanently attached
to the probationer, and a GPS-enabled cellular telephone, which
communicates with the ankle bracelet and transmits the probation121
er’s current location to the probation department.” A monitoring
agent called the tracking cell phone to inform Thissell that he should
not enter the water because it would damage the device that was
122
permanently attached to his ankle.
Even though the inability to
swim in the ocean might not seem to be a significant limitation on
the wearer’s rights, such limitations could also translate into a government order that the person shall not swim in the ocean or a pool
or shall not submerge his ankle during a bath for the remainder of
his life.
Out of the three main models, the Massachusetts Model gives
the most judicial discretion because the judiciary is allowed to determine the requisite probationary period based on an individual assessment of the risk that a person poses to society. The individualized
assessment is important because it allows tailoring of a probation period based on the actual risk that the offender poses to society, as op116

See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178H (2011) (mandating lifetime community parole supervision for certain sex offenders who violate their registration requirements); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 133D1/2 (2010) (mandating GPS tracking for
the length of the community parole supervision).
117
928 N.E.2d 932 (Mass. 2010).
118
Id. at 933.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 934–35.
121
Id. at 933 n.1 (quoting Commonwealth v. Raposo, 905 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Mass.
2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122
Thissell, 928 N.E.2d at 934.

DANTE_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 10:51 AM

COMMENT

1185

posed to determining the probation period based on the overall
threat that people who commit a specific crime generally pose to society as a whole. It is still a very strict statute, however. Given the
wide range of offenses covered under the Massachusetts statute and
the imposition of mandatory electronic monitoring of whatever probationary period the court deems just and proper, there are still a
great number of people who will be tracked under this statute for the
foreseeable future. The Massachusetts Model does represent a
unique statutory model but it has not, to date, been enacted in any
other jurisdiction.
D. The Hybrid Models
Florida, California, and Massachusetts were the first three states
123
to enact detailed statutes for the GPS tracking of sex offenders, but
not all states have followed their lead. Some have followed the feder124
ally mandated registration requirements only; others have adopted
their own statutory solutions for the electronic monitoring of sex of125
fenders.
1.

States Without a Sex-Offender-Tracking Statute

Only nine U.S. jurisdictions have failed to implement some form
126
of electronic monitoring since 2005.
These nine states have continued to rely solely on registration laws to protect society from the
127
danger of sex-offender recidivism. Even some of these jurisdictions,
however, have expressed interest in the possibility of sex-offender
GPS-tracking legislation. For example, two of these states, Indiana
and Kansas, have undertaken feasibility studies to explore the possi-

123

See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-7 (LexisNexis 2011) (effective Mar. 24, 2006);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4904 (2011) (effective Apr. 22, 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
17.510 (LexisNexis 2011) (effective Mar. 27, 2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34-A, § 11202
(2011) (effective June 23, 2005); MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2009) (effective Aug. 1,
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-B:2 (2011) (effective Aug. 9, 1996); OKLA. STAT. tit.
57, § 583 (2010) (effective Mar. 15, 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.595 (2011) (effective
July 14, 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5402 (2011) (effective Sept. 1, 1996).
125
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-923 (2011) (effective Apr. 7, 2006); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 176A.410(1), (2)(b)–(c) (2011) (effective Oct. 1, 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:43-6.4(a) (West 2011) (effective Jan. 14, 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.91(c)
(West 2011) (effective Aug. 6, 2007); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 837-r(1), (2)(d) (Consol.
2011) (effective Apr. 13, 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4) (Consol. 2011) (effective
June 22, 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b) (2011) (effective July 1, 2004);
WASH. REV. CODE . § 9.94A.704(5) (2011) (effective Aug. 1, 2009).
126
See statutes cited supra, note 124.
127
See statutes cited supra, note 125.
124
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bility of implementing an electronic-monitoring sex-offender stat128
ute.
Indiana, while currently without an electronic monitoring statute, did implement a pilot program to assess the costs of tracking vio129
lent sex offenders by GPS. The Indiana Department of Correction
(IDOC) explored the costs of active GPS tracking of violent sex offenders, and the report submitted to the legislative council discusses
130
the positive and the negative findings from the pilot program. The
IDOC found that the GPS technology was an asset for parole agents
in keeping track of the parolees whom they were required to monitor
and that the ability of agents to utilize the technology from laptops
131
with wireless accessibility improved the agents’ mobility.
The IDOC report also found the following negative points with
the technology: 1) poor utilization of police resources due to false
alarms, 2) high costs of $15–$22 per offender, per day, 3) ankle
bracelets are not actually permanent because they can be removed,
4) the GPS technology does not prevent crimes from occurring, 5)
comparable results between GPS technology and traditional electronic monitoring technology, 6) logistical problems with monitoring
homeless offenders, and 7) signal-reception issues with the technolo132
gy. Since the report was issued, a GPS-tracking statute has not been
enacted and there are no bills in the state legislature to implement
such a system.
133
Kansas, likewise, created a Sex Offender Policy Board (SOPB)
that explored the utilization of sex offender electronic monitoring
and issued a report to the Kansas Criminal Justice Coordinating
134
Council. The SOPB found that GPS-tracking technology should be
utilized only selectively, for the worst offenders, by assessing the risk
for each individual to determine who are the offenders who “pose the
135
greatest risk to the community.”
The board found that the technology, by itself, “will not change behavior and is not enough to pro128

See IND. DEP’T OF CORR., 2007 RESEARCHED COST OF GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS
(2007),
available
at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/igareports/agency/reports/CORR05.pdf; KAN. SEX
OFFENDER POLICY BD., REPORT (2007), available at http://www.calcasa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2007/11/sopbreport.pdf.
129
See IND. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 128.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9501(8)(F)(i) (2011).
134
KAN. SEX OFFENDER POLICY BD., supra note 128.
135
Id. at 2.
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136

vide security for the community.” It also found most of the negative
consequences of the GPS-tracking technology that the Indiana report
137
noted.
Like Indiana, Kansas has not implemented a GPS-tracking
sex-offender statute; civil commitment is still the preferred method of
138
dealing with dangerous sex offenders in Kansas.
Such interest in
the concept, however, shows that the remaining nine states without
GPS-tracking of sex offenders may utilize some form of the technology as costs decrease and the devices become more reliable.
2. States with Discretionary Electronic Monitoring
Some states have enacted statutes that are entirely discretionary,
allowing a court to impose electronic monitoring on those sex offenders who are determined to be a high risk on an individualized
basis, but these states vary greatly in how and under what circumstances this discretion may be used. Six states have passed statutes
that specifically address electronic monitoring and give judges much
more discretion than the Florida, California, and Massachusetts
139
Models. For example, Arkansas enacted a statute that only applies
to “a sex offender determined to be a sexually violent predator” and
requires electronic monitoring on an individual basis “for a period
140
not less than ten (10) years” upon release. The “not less than” language in the Arkansas statute indicates that the court may impose a
longer period of electronic monitoring, depending on the individualized risk assessment.
In Nevada, the Chief Parole and Probation Officer assesses the
individual risk that a sex offender poses and has the discretion to
recommend electronic monitoring for a period up to the offender’s
141
natural life.
New Jersey mandates that judges who sentence defendants convicted of certain sexual offenses require lifetime parole

136

Id.
Id. (noting issues with technology limitations, increased workload of supervisors, lack of actual crime prevention, high costs, and removal of devices by offenders).
138
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
139
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-923 (2011) (effective Apr. 7, 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §
176A.410(1), (2)(b)–(c) (2011) (effective Oct. 1, 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:436.4(a) (West 2011) (effective Jan. 14, 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.91(c) (West
2011) (effective Aug. 6, 2007); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 837-r(1), (2)(d) (Consol. 2011) (effective Apr. 13, 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4) (Consol. 2011) (effective June 22,
2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b) (2011) (effective July 1, 2004); WASH. REV.
CODE . § 9.94A.704(5) (2011) (effective Aug. 1, 2009).
140
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-923(a)(1) (2011) (effective Apr. 7, 2006).
141
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.410(1), (2)(b)–(c) (2011) (effective Oct. 1, 2007).
137
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142

or community supervision and then gives judges full discretion to
143
impose electronic monitoring as a “condition of discharge.”
New
York, in 2007, created an Office of Sex Offender Management to assess individualized sex offender risks, and it is within its discretion to
144
use electronic monitoring as a “supervisory tool.” In addition, the
courts also have discretion to impose electronic monitoring as a con145
dition of probation when it would “advance public safety.” Tennessee and Washington place the responsibility for the individualized
risk assessment on their respective boards of probation and parole
and provide the boards with discretion to use electronic monitoring
146
on high-risk offenders.
Other states never get that specific and allow GPS monitoring as
a general “tool” that courts may implement as they see fit without
specifying or mandating when it needs to be used with specific statutory guidelines. There are twelve jurisdictions where a vague electronic-monitoring condition is one tool that judges or probationary
147
boards have within their sole discretion. Each of these states allow
some circumstances under which electronic monitoring may be imposed on a post-incarceration sex offender without specifying how
such a tool must be utilized. The degree of judicial discretion in these states is much higher than under the Florida, California, or Massa148
chusetts Models, and strict bright-line rules have been avoided in
favor of judicial flexibility.
For example, in Colorado, a sex offender who is released on parole is subject to a period of parole that will last at least ten years for
class four felonies and twenty years for class two or three felonies and

142

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.4(a) (West 2011) (effective Jan. 14, 2004).
Id. § 30:4-123.91(c) (effective Aug. 6, 2007).
144
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 837-r(1), (2)(d) (Consol. 2011) (effective Apr. 13, 2007).
145
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4) (Consol. 2011) (effective June 22, 2010).
146
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b) (2011) (effective July 1, 2004); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.94A.704(5) (2011) (effective Aug. 1, 2009).
147
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(XIV.5) (2011) (effective Mar. 8, 2006);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(a)(14) (2011) (effective Oct. 1, 2003); D.C. CODE § 221211 (2011) (effective Dec. 10, 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 353G-7(a)(4)(D) (2011) (effective July 7, 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-624(2)(p) (LexisNexis 2011) (effective
June 22, 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-84 (2011) (effective July 1, 2007); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 83-174.03 (LexisNexis 2011) (effective Apr. 13, 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-32-07(3)(f) (2011) (effective Apr. 4, 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.13(L)
(LexisNexis 2011) (effective Aug. 3, 2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9798.3 (2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.221 (West 2010) (effective Sept. 1,
1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1(8)(a)(vi) (2011) (effective Mar. 21, 1995); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 7-13-1102 (2011) (effective July 1, 1996).
148
See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
143
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will last at most for the rest of the sex offender’s life. Although the
statute does not explicitly mandate any form of electronic monitoring, when determining a period of probation, a judge is allowed to
require the probationer to “[b]e subject to electronic or global posi150
tion monitoring.” While it is not explicitly stated, the combination
of various Colorado statutory provision does put the possibility of lifetime electronic monitoring, based entirely on the judge’s discretion,
151
in a judge’s toolkit.
Similarly, in Connecticut and Mississippi the
court may, but need not, impose electronic monitoring as a condition
152
of probation.
Some states, while making vague mention of a possibility of the
use of GPS tracking, do not specify any guidelines for its utilization.
In the District of Columbia, for example, a statute makes it unlawful
for anyone to tamper with a global positioning device that is required
as a condition of various sentencing options, including probation,
153
supervised release, and parole.
At no other point, however, does
the D.C. Code specify the circumstances under which electronic
monitoring may be imposed; thus a vague reference to tampering
implies that a possibility of GPS tracking exists. Texas also makes a
vague reference to the possibility of electronic monitoring as a condition of parole, but does not specify the use of electronic monitoring
154
in relation to sex offenses.
There are also a couple of states that are truly unique in their
treatment of the issue. For example, Ohio is unique in that its statute
applies only to sex offenders who do not serve a prison sentence (applying to probation-only sentences), and it is within the Ohio courts’
discretion to impose the electronic monitoring (it is not mandato155
ry).
Minnesota, while not having authorized GPS tracking for sex
offenders, does have an electronic-monitoring program for those who
156
The statute is limited to crimes “comcommit domestic violence.
157
mitted against a family or household member,” but it does encom-

149

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1006(b) (2011).
Id. § 18-1.3-204 (2)(a)(XIV.5).
151
See id. §§ 18-1.3-1006(b), 18-1.3-204 (2)(a)(XIV.5).
152
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(a)(14) (2011) (effective May 26, 2006); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-84 (2011) (effective July 1, 2007).
153
D.C. CODE § 22-1211 (2011) (effective Dec. 10, 2009).
154
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.221 (West 2011) (effective Sept. 1, 1997).
155
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.13(L) (LexisNexis 2011).
156
See MINN. STAT. § 611A.07 (2011) (effective Apr. 30, 1992).
157
Id. § 518B.01 (2010).
150
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158

pass “criminal sexual conduct,” which allows a minimal level of sex159
offender tracking in situations of sexual abuse within the family.
In summary, a vast majority of states allow some form of electronic monitoring of sex offenders, but the specific provisions of such
statutes can vary greatly. Most of the statutes that differ from the
Florida, the California, or the Massachusetts Models do so because of
the degree of judicial or regulatory-agency discretion that they grant,
but these states still have systems in place to monitor those sex offenders who pose the greatest risks, especially to children. There are
forty-two different statutes that in some way allow for sex-offender
GPS tracking (including in the District of Columbia), and this number does not even include actions that the federal government has
taken on this issue.
E. The Federal Models
At the same time when a supermajority of states enacted some
form of sex-offender tracking legislation, the U.S. Congress entered
the debate in two different ways: through direct statutory action and
through state-funding programs. In 2005, during the public outcry
over the death of Jessica Lunsford, Congress made its first and only
official attempt to directly legislate for electronic monitoring of sex
160
offenders at the federal level. Modeled after the Florida statute and
called the Jessica Lunsford Act, the House bill would have amended
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
161
162
Offender Registration Program in a couple of key ways.
First, it
would have strengthened the sex-offender registration program by
requiring states to verify the last known address of sex offenders by
163
randomly mailing a verification form at least twice a year. If the offender did not mail the form back within a predetermined time thus
verifying the accuracy of his registered address, he would be held lia164
ble as if he had never registered at all.
Second, and more relevant to this Comment’s discussion, the
bill would have required electronic monitoring of certain sex offenders who habitually failed to follow their registration requirements for
at least five years upon release or ten years if they were considered
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
MINN. STAT. § 629.72, subd. 2a (20011) (effective Apr. 30, 1992).
H.R. 1505, 109th Cong. (2005).
42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).
See H.R. 1505.
Id. § 2(a).
Id.
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“violent predators.”
This was a direct federal requirement on the
states not only to have a program to track registration of sex offenders within their borders but also to implement an enforcement
mechanism with “location-transmitting device[s]” to verify their
166
whereabouts.
Representative Ginny Brown-Waite from Florida introduced this bill in the House on April 6, 2005, along with eighty-six
co-sponsors (twenty-one Democrats and sixty-five Republicans), but
167
the bill never made it out of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Although direct federal control of sex-offender tracking never
came out of congressional committee, another piece of legislation
had a much larger impact on the issue by tying state action to federal
grants. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 implemented a Sex Offender Monitoring Program that authorized the
Attorney General to award Jessica Lunsford and Sarah Lunde Grants
to various state and local governments if they complied with the stat168
ed minimum standards. These standards required states, at a minimum, to set up programs to track sex offenders with active electronic-monitoring devices twenty-four hours a day in order to get a federal
169
grant. The statute authorized $5,000,000 in grants and gave a major financial incentive for each state to pass a sex-offender tracking
170
statute.
It is hardly a coincidence that most of the state statutes analyzed
above were implemented between 2007 and 2009, the period for
which the state grants were authorized. Even though a bill that would
have allowed the federal government to mandate electronic monitoring for sex offenders never made it out of the House of Representatives, the federal government still achieved its goal by providing the
financial incentive needed to move the states into action where federal legislation could not be passed. While legislation requiring some
form of electronic monitoring of sex offenders has proliferated over

165

Id. § 2(c).
Id.
167
H.R.
1505
(109th):
Jessica
Lunsford
Act,
GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr1505 (last visited June 11, 2012). After a hearing in the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security on June 9, 2005, movement on the Jessica Lunsford Act ceased because the
provisions that Congress wished to pass were included in H.R. 4472, the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act. The provision for federal GPS tracking of sex offenders was not passed and no further efforts for federal tracking of sex offenders
were pursued in later sessions. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-749, at 102 (2007).
168
See 42 U.S.C. § 16981(a)(1) (2006) (effective July 27, 2006).
169
See § 16981(a)(1)(C).
170
§ 16981(c)(1).
166

DANTE_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/24/2012 10:51 AM

1192

[Vol. 42:1169

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

the past six years, the statutes for the most part have not faced constitutional review beyond the various challenges to retroactive applica171
tion.
As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found, GPS
tracking is “dramatically more intrusive and burdensome” when
172
compared to registration only.
This Comment will next assess
whether these statutes go too far in reducing the constitutional rights
of sex offenders.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALITY
One of the chief reasons for the Framers to write the Constitution was to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Pos173
terity.” And it is the province of the courts to determine whether or
174
not a law is “repugnant to the Constitution” and thus void.
Although a majority of states have determined that the individual rights
175
of sex offenders are secondary to the safety of society at large, when
the government decides to intrude upon the protections that the
Constitution bestows on all Americans, this determination must ultimately be made by the courts.
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to determine the constitutionality of GPS tracking of sex offenders, Part III will review some
of the various constitutional arguments against such statutes. Part
III.A will review the argument that retroactive application of the stat176
utes violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Part
III.B will review the argument that the long-term or permanent GPS
tracking of sex offenders violates their freedom of movement, both
intrastate and interstate. Part III.C will review the argument that attaching GPS-locators to sex offenders’ bodies violates their freedom
to control their own bodily integrity free from unreasonable government intrusion. Finally, Part III.D will review the argument that a
tracking device cannot continuously transmit evidence regarding the
offender’s location for hypothetical future crimes without violating
177
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches.

171
See, e.g., Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181–82 (E.D. Cal.
2007); People v. Milligan, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
172
Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196 (Mass. 2009).
173
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
174
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
175
See supra Part II.
176
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).
177
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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A. Retroactive Application Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S.
Constitution
One issue with sex-offender tracking statutes arises when a state
attempts to apply a new law to a sex offender who has committed his
crime before the effective date of the tracking statute. An ex post facto law is a law that criminalizes behavior that was legal when originally
committed; the ex post facto prohibition, however, does not apply to
178
civil laws enforced retroactively. Some courts have found that electronic monitoring requirements violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and
thus may not be applied retroactively, while other courts have found
that the laws are non-punitive in nature, and thus, do not violate the
179
Ex Post Facto Clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on
this issue, but there is already a well-established framework in place to
make this determination, which the Court used when it found that
sex offender registration laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
180
when applied retroactively.
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court entered the debate about
sex-offender registration and found that the retroactive application of
registration laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause under the
“well-established” framework for deciding whether or not a law has
181
crossed the line from civil proceedings to criminal punishment.
Under the Court’s guidelines, the first step is to “ascertain whether
the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings;” if
the legislature intended to impose the law as a punishment, it would
“end the inquiry” and any retroactive application would violate the Ex
182
Post Facto Clause.
If the Court determines that the legislature intended to enact a civil proceeding or that the legislature’s intent is
ambiguous, the next step is to analyze whether the statute’s effects on
178

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
Compare Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180–81 (E.D. Cal.
2007) (holding that the California monitoring statute was only to be applied prospectively and noting that applying it retroactively would “raise serious ex post facto
concerns”), with Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
retroactive application of the Tennessee monitoring statute does not violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause because the statute is non-punitive), and State v. Bare, 677 S.E.2d
518, 528 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that retroactive application of the North
Carolina monitoring statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it is a
civil regulatory scheme and no more punitive than sex-offender registration).
180
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that Alaska’s sex offender registration statute was a non-punitive civil regulatory scheme and, therefore, retroactive application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).
181
Id. at 92.
182
Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179
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the individual are punitive under the seven-factor Mendoza-Martinez
183
test.
The Mendoza-Martinez test, under which the Court determines
whether the sanctions that a statute imposes are punitive in nature,
asks: (1) whether the statute imposes “an affirmative disability or restraint,” (2) whether the sanction imposed has traditionally been regarded as a punishment, (3) whether the sanction is imposed only
184
upon a showing of scienter, (4) whether the sanction promotes retribution and deterrence, (5) whether the sanction applies to behavior
that was already a crime, (6) whether a separate, rationally related
purpose can be attributed to the sanctions aside from punishment,
and (7) whether the sanction seems excessive in relation to the alter185
native purpose attributed to the statute.
While this list is “neither
186
exhaustive nor dispositive,” the Supreme Court applied the Mendoza-Martinez test when it determined the constitutionality of imposing
sex-offender registration requirements retroactively, and thus it is a
fair assumption that the same analysis applies to sex-offender tracking
187
statutes as well.
Although the explicit legislative intent for enacting a sexoffender tracking statute is not always stated, it is likely that when the
Supreme Court does face this issue, even if the legislative intent is
stated, it will not be alone dispositive one way or the other. For example, in the text of the Colorado tracking statute, the legislature
explicitly stated that “continued monitoring of sex offenders at each
stage of the criminal justice system . . . will curtail recidivistic behavior
and the protection of victims and potential victims will be en188
hanced.”
This, on its face, would probably be classified as a “civil
regulatory scheme” because the goal is not to punish the offenders
but rather to protect the potential victims; this is the same legislative

183
See id. at 97 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69
(1963)).
184
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004) (“A degree of knowledge that
makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his act or omission; the
fact of an act’s having been done knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or
criminal punishment.” (emphasis added)).
185
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69.
186
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
187
See id.
188
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-101 (2010) (repealed 2011) (stating that the legislative intent in passing the statute was to reduce recidivism threats). The legislature
changed this language only one year later, clarifying that “[t]he general assembly
does not intend to imply that all offenders can or will positively respond to treatment.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-101(2) (2011).

DANTE_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 10:51 AM

1195

COMMENT
189

goal that the Supreme Court deemed “civil” in Smith. The true determination of whether or not sex-offender tracking statutes are punitive in nature will be based on the Mendoza-Martinez review.
Unlike registration requirements, however, the Court could still
very easily find that requiring an offender to wear a GPS-tracking device for an extended period is punitive in nature under the MendozaMartinez analysis. Offenders are forbidden to go near certain areas,
190
such as anywhere where “children congregate,” which constantly
requires them to plan their paths ahead of time to ensure that they
will not pass by a school, a playground, or a shopping mall and face
harsh punishments. Such broad statutory limitations on movement
are definitely affirmative restraints on how an offender can live his
191
life.
Unlike registration requirements—under which members of
the public must actively seek out the information whether someone is
a sex offender—electronic monitoring requires that a sex offender
have a device on the outermost layer of clothing, which makes the
192
device visible to the public wherever he goes. As public awareness
of sex-offender-tracking requirements grows, these devices may very
well become “modern day ‘scarlet letter[s]’” that expose the offender
to public shame and hostility—a sanction that has traditionally been
193
regarded as punishment.
An alternative justification for sex-offender tracking is reducing
194
sex-offender recidivism, but this is not likely to sway the Supreme
Court to allow retroactive application of such requirements because
long-term or lifetime GPS tracking is excessive in relation to that
purpose. Such sanctions do not prevent crimes, but merely give the
195
police an active source of evidence to solve crimes after-the-fact.
Sex-offender registration was found, under the Mendoza-Martinez test,
189
190
191
192
193

See Smith, 538 U.S. at 93.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2011).
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1009 (6th Cir. 2007) (Keith, J., dissenting in

part).
194

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-101 (2010).
See IND. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 128 (noting that a major negative aspect of
GPS monitoring is the “[c]reation of a false sense of security because GPS monitoring does not prevent crimes from happening.” (emphasis added)). Real-time tracking
of a sex offender may act as a deterrent because the offender knows that he can be
traced, but it cannot actually prevent crimes from occurring because it is impossible
to know what the offender is doing at a given moment even if the police knew his location. Thus, the only practical effect of GPS-tracking statutes is to provide evidence
of location after the fact or the hope that the sex offender will be less likely to commit crimes if he knows that the state is following him.
195
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to be a non-punitive civil regulation, but sex-offender-tracking statutes interfere with the rights of the offenders to a much greater extent and have much more permanent punitive effect on these rights.
If the Court does find that these statutes have a punitive effect, retroactive application would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Even prospective application after the effective date of the statute, however,
could be unconstitutional if the laws go too far.
B. Sex-Offender Tracking Statutes Unreasonably Restrict Freedom of
Movement
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether sex-offender
tracking statutes infringe on an offender’s freedom of movement.
Wearing a GPS tracking device for decades, or even for the course of
his life, does not directly inhibit an offender’s movement, but the issue is more complex. Under the broad concept of “personal liberty,”
the Supreme Court has recognized that a person has a right to travel
throughout the country “uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations
196
that unreasonably burden or restrict this movement” and that the
freedom to move without government interference is “a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us
197
all.”
1. Intrastate Freedom of Movement
These statutes directly interfere with the freedom of movement
by prohibiting offenders from entering designated exclusionary
zones. The Wisconsin statute is a good example of these exclusionary
provisions. It sets specific areas where the offender may not go, focusing on “areas where children congregate, with perimeters of 100
198
to 250 feet.” Such exclusions are similar to a restraining order and
can encompass other areas, including the “victim’s residence, place
199
of employment and school.” These zones, set out at the time when
probation is enacted, are the only explicit restrictions to the offender’s freedom of movement. Thus even under the personal liberty test
in Saenz v. Roe, these would likely pass judicial review as reasonable
limitations because a person who commits any sexual act with a child
should not be able to knowingly go where children congregate just as
196

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 629 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197
Id. at 498 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643) (internal quotation marks omitted).
198
WIS. STAT. § 301.48(3)(c) (2011).
199
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 133D1/2 (2011).
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a person who sexually assaults another person should not be able to
approach the victim when he is let out of prison. This does not
acknowledge, however, the other incidental ways that the tracked offender’s freedom of movement is impacted by GPS-tracking statutes.
Judicial review of GPS-tracking statutes has not yet reached the
Supreme Court, but there have been cases in the lower courts that
have challenged the statutes’ validity. In 2007, for example, a sex of200
fender challenged Tennessee’s Monitoring Act on various grounds.
One of the grounds was that it “ha[d] a marked effect on his lifestyle
201
and freedom of movement.” The offender, Doe, explained that he
was “required to carry with him at all times when not at his residence
a relatively large box that contains the electronics necessary for the
202
monitoring to take place.” He had to wear the tracking device on
the outside of his outermost layer of clothing that was “obvious to any
203
onlooker.”
Doe was burdened in ways other than the visibility of the tracking box. If he was going into any building, he would need to wait
204
several minutes before entering to allow the device to reset. Once
inside the building, Doe would need to exit the building “at least
205
once every hour so that monitoring could take place.” In addition,
as in Thissell, Doe was forbidden to “swim or participate in any other
206
water activity” because the device was not waterproof. GPS tracking
207
also made taking a bath impossible due to its limitations.
In addition to the incidental restrictions on Doe’s movements,
208
Doe experienced additional burdens due to device malfunctions.
Doe went on a vacation after receiving permission from the authorities, and because the device was not transmitting properly, he was repeatedly threatened with immediate arrest if he did not call in to the
209
probation officer.
This was just one of the many times in the two
years that Doe was required to wear the GPS tracker that the device
210
Although the apmalfunctioned, causing extreme inconvenience.
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1001–02 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Doe, 507 F.3d at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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peals court found that these limitations were not “punitive” in nature,
Doe’s description of the day-to-day effect of living with a GPS monitor
is instructive; he would have to consider whether or not the state
would allow him to go where he wanted to go and worry about
whether a device malfunction would get him arrested.
Judge Keith’s partial dissent in Bredesen cautioned that the requirement to always carry a visible tracking box with him exposed
211
Doe to public scorn. By contrast, the majority opinion found that
members of the public would not know what the GPS tracking device
was, and even if they did, they would not know that such a device des212
ignated the person wearing it as a sex offender. However true the
majority’s point may have been in 2007, public knowledge and perception of GPS tracking devices will change as almost every jurisdiction has passed sex-offender tracking statutes, which will change the
213
reality in line with the dissent’s point of view.
Judge Keith considered the “relatively large box as a symbol of
[Doe’s] crime for all to see,” arguing that it had the effect of a “mod214
ern day ‘scarlet letter.’” Judge Keith went on to reflect that forcing
a sex offender to wear the GPS-tracking box anywhere he went “[wa]s
dangerously close to having a law enforcement officer openly escorting him to every place he [chose] to visit for all [the general public]
215
to see, but without the ability to prevent him from re-offending.” As
these statutes proliferate and public awareness of GPS tracking of sex
offenders increases with time, sex offenders will be faced with increasing scorn from the public when they venture out of their homes. Unlike registration laws, in the case of which the sex offender only worries about facing those members of the public who actively seek out
his sex-offender status and actually recognize him, a tracked sex offender worries about anyone who may suspect that the GPS-tracker
216
designates him as a high-risk sex offender.

211

Id. at 1008–09 (Keith, J., dissenting in part).
Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1005 (majority opinion).
213
See, e.g., Brian Joseph, GPS Units Fail to Protect Public from Sex Offenders, ORANGE
CNTY.
REG.
(June
18,
2010
3:00
AM),
http://taxdollars.ocregister.com/2010/06/18/gps-units-fail-to-protect-public-fromsex-offenders/59253/ (giving an overview of the California tracking statute and
providing an example of the increased coverage that GPS tracking of sex offenders
has received since 2007).
214
Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1009 (Keith, J., dissenting in part).
215
Id. at 1012.
216
But cf. United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 610 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that forcing a man convicted of stealing mail to stand outside a post office wearing a
signboard stating that he stole mail was an allowable form of public shaming).
212
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Although not a direct restriction on the offender’s freedom of
movement, the possibility of public scorn and hostility is definitely an
incidental restriction on a sex offender’s ability to move freely within
the state in which he lives. If the government forces an offender to
permanently wear a tracking device, which causes the offender to
face fear, apprehension, anger, or outright hostility every time he
leaves his home, it cannot truly be said that his freedom of movement
is not infringed. As knowledge of the “scarlet letter” device hooked
to an offender’s belt increases, the sex-offender-tracking statute will
eventually lead to state-sponsorship of two classes of citizens: those
who can travel freely, and those who can only leave their homes if
217
they are willing to face public condemnation.
2. Interstate Freedom of Movement
Another fundamental right articulated in Saenz is the right to
218
travel freely between states.
Some states, such as Montana, deal
219
with interstate considerations explicitly in their statutes.
In Montana, if a tracked offender is allowed to “transfer supervision to another state,” he must “pay a fee of $50 to cover the cost of processing
220
the transfer.” This implies that if the offender wishes to exercise his
fundamental right to travel between states, he can only do so if he
first gets permission from the monitoring body, pays a $50 transfer
fee, and the new state is willing to take over tracking responsibilities.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court, when proclaiming such a fundamental right, intended for the right to be subject to the bureaucracy of two state governments. The statute also does not clarify what
would happen if an offender who is tracked wants to move to a state
that does not impose GPS tracking for sex offenders. Nor does it deal
with the jurisdictional issues that could possibly come from a GPS
tracking device transmitting location data to the home state even
when the offender is no longer within the jurisdictional boundary of
that state.
Some sex-offender-tracking statutes make reference to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS), an interstate

217
See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 6, at 158–59 (explaining how post-conviction
restrictions can push ex-offenders into a realm of second-class citizenship).
218
526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999).
219
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-1031(1)(b) (2011).
220
Id.
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effort to monitor sex-offender risks.
One of the main purposes of
the ICAOS, as the enacting statutes indicate, is to “[p]rovide for the
effective tracking, supervision, and rehabilitation of these [sex] of222
fenders by the sending and receiving states.” All fifty states and the
223
District of Columbia are members of the ICAOS.
This should be
the interstate agency to coordinate transfers of sex offenders currently being tracked by their original states, but it is unclear whether
ICAOS has an efficient process in place to safeguard offenders’ freedom of interstate movement not only when they are moving to another state but also when they are just crossing into a neighboring
state for a temporary trip.
If the states are going to condition the exercise of an offender’s
right of interstate movement on the states’ approval, then there
needs to be an efficient process in place that will accomplish that in
the least-restrictive way possible. If states are going to restrict interstate movement even for day-trips into neighboring states, then it is
likely impossible for the bureaucracies of two different states to make
the process efficient enough to make it practical for the offender to
even try to get permission unless he knows at least a week in advance
that he will need to travel out of his home state. In situations where a
sex offender lives on the border of two different states and could possibly be employed or have family across the border, GPS-tracking
statutes could truly become burdensome on the offender’s freedom
of interstate movement, and this aspect of sex-offender tracking statutes could be held unconstitutional.
C. Sex-Offender Tracking Statutes Unreasonably Interfere with
Offenders’ Bodily Integrity
The Supreme Court has also yet to deal with the question
whether requiring a sex offender to wear a GPS unit on his body for
the rest of his natural life unreasonably interferes with his bodily integrity. There are two different ways that the Supreme Court could
find such interference, and this section will discuss both in turn.
First, these statutes require that a sex offender wear a permanent
tracking device on his body. Second, as the technology of GPS track-

221

See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.1243(2)(b) (2011) (“Lifetime supervision
shall be deemed a form of parole for . . . [t]he purposes of the Interstate Compact
for Adult Offender Supervision . . . .”).
222
WIS. STAT. § 304.16(1)(a)(2) (2011) (emphasis added).
223
State and Region Maps—ICAOS Directory, INTERSTATE COMM’N ADULT OFFENDER
SUPERVISION, http://www.interstatecompact.org/Directory/ RegionsStates.aspx (last
visited Apr. 17, 2011).
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ing devices gets smaller and more efficient, it is possible that these
tracking devices, which are currently only attached to the exterior of
the offender’s body, break the skin and be permanently implanted in
the offender’s body.
1.

Freedom of Bodily Integrity from Unreasonable
Government Intrusion

The Supreme Court has not yet dealt with state action that interferes with the exterior of one’s body in the way that a permanent GPS
tracker does, but it has addressed state action that interferes with a
224
person’s right to be “secure in [his] person[]” from state action. In
Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court considered whether a police officer’s order that a hospital take a blood sample from a drunk
225
driver without his consent violated his personal liberty. After rejecting the argument that the “Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires the human body in all circumstances to be held
inviolate against state expeditions seeking evidence of [a] crime,” the
Court went on to explore whether such action violated Schmerber’s
226
Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his person. This was the
Court’s first analysis of a search inside one’s body, and its starting
point was whether the government’s violation of Schmerber’s bodily
integrity to search for evidence “[was] justified in the circumstances,
227
or [was] made in an improper manner.”
The Court found that when the police are searching a person’s
body and are not authorized by previous exceptions to the warrant
228
requirement (e.g., a search incident to a lawful arrest or a Terry
229
“stop and frisk” search for weapons to protect officer safety), “[t]he
interests in human dignity and privacy [that] the Fourth Amendment
protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired
230
evidence might be obtained.” Even though the blood test involved
231
a search “beyond the body’s surface,” the same Fourth Amendment
224

U.S. CONST. amend IV.
384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966).
226
Id. at 767.
227
Id. at 768.
228
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (establishing the “search
incident to a lawful arrest” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, allowing a limited search of a person when lawfully arrested to look for weapons).
229
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968) (allowing an officer to conduct a
limited frisk of a suspect when there is reasonable suspicion that he may be armed).
230
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769–70.
231
See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
225
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protections would apply to GPS-tracking. Much like the blood test in
Schmerber, the constant flow of information that the GPS tracker provides to police is primarily used as evidence of possible wrongdoing.
And the blood sample in Schmerber was used to provide evidence
about a drunk-driving accident that had already occurred; the connection between the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment
and monitoring through a GPS tracking device is even less clear
where the police are gathering evidence from a sex offender’s body
based on the possibility that a crime may be committed in the future.
The Supreme Court found that “[i]n the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evi232
dence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.”
No
matter how high the risk of recidivism is with a sex offender, the police will seldom be able to determine when a crime will be committed, if ever. Also, unlike the momentary bodily violation that the
blood test in Schmerber represented, the long-term tracking of a sex
offender represents a constant government infringement on the offender’s body in the interest of obtaining evidence for a hypothetical
future crime. Under Schmerber, the Supreme Court should find that
this is an unreasonable infringement of the “fundamental human interest” that a person has over his own body.
In the majority of the state sex-offender-tracking statutes, an individualized risk assessment is not necessary and tracking is imposed
233
categorically based on the crime committed. In these circumstances, the government’s ability to justify the infringement of a person’s
rights to his own body to get possible evidence of a future crime is
precarious at best. In United States v. Polouizzi, the district court first
found that even requiring the wearing of a GPS tracker while a person is awaiting trial is a greater infringement of individual liberty
234
than it appears at first glance.
The court then held that even
though the government interest in protecting children is significant,
“a per se rule that the governmental interest always outweighs the con235
stitutional right of liberty denies due process.” When a state imposes a mandatory electronic-monitoring statute on an entire class of
criminals without an individual risk assessment, the state is making a
judgment that the governmental interest automatically outweighs all

232
233
234
235

Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
697 F. Supp. 2d 381, 392–93 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id.
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of those individuals’ rights to their own bodies, regardless of whether
individual circumstances would indicate otherwise.
Under the court’s rationale in Polouizzi, a per se application of
GPS-tracking requirements without any individualized risk assessment
would deny the individual’s liberty without due process. These are
devices that, while not surgically attached to the outside of an offender’s body, must be worn on a person’s body for his entire life to help
prevent, or at least provide evidence of, future crimes. Such an
“[a]ssessment of the risk of future crime by particular individuals at
this state of our knowledge is hazardous and fraught with uncertain236
ty.”
In Schmerber, the Court held that because there was probable
cause to arrest the drunk driver even without the blood sample, such
a minor intrusion into the body to collect evidence that would have
disappeared with time was reasonable to protect evidence of a
237
crime. With GPS trackers, however, such intrusion to the exterior
of one’s body cannot be justified by probable cause that a crime will
be committed prospectively. Given the rationale behind Schmerber
and Polouizzi, if a state wants to violate an offender’s bodily rights with
a GPS tracking device, such actions should only result from an individualized risk assessment if these statutes are to survive constitutional
review. Currently, as discussed in Part II, the majority of states do not
provide for such individualized review.
2.

Technological Advances in Tracking Technologies

Schmerber dealt with a minor intrusion under the body’s surface
to collect blood and does not directly apply to analysis of external
tracking devices, but the technology for internal GPS tracking is on
the horizon. In Bredesen, the majority justified the inconvenience of
wearing a GPS tracker based on the fact that it was the same size as a
walkie-talkie and would “only become smaller and less cumbersome
238
as technology progresses.”
GPS tracking devices smaller than the
239
six-inch device that Doe wore in 2007 are already on the market,
and there are also potential devices that could be planted under a

236

Id. at 392.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71.
238
Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1005 (6th Cir. 2007).
239
See Spark Nano Real-Time GPS Tracking Device, BRICKHOUSE SECURITY,
http://www.brickhousesecurity.com/covert-small-gps-tracking-device.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2012) (selling a GPS tracking device smaller than the palm of one’s hand
for less than $200).
237
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240

person’s skin —a much greater invasion of an offender’s rights to
his body than the external device in Bredesen caused.
As early as 2003, Applied Digital Solutions, Inc. patented and
tested “the first-ever subdermal GPS ‘personal location device’
241
(PLD).” This device was 2.5 inches long by 1.5 inches wide, and the
company reported that the device could ultimately be approximately
242
one-half to one-tenth of that size. This technology is currently not
as readily available as the company’s report in 2003 would have indicated, but it is a prime example of the direction in which this technology is headed. Not surprisingly, Applied Digital Solution’s report
243
focused on the positive uses of such a device, but there is nothing in
the current sex-offender statutes that prevents such implantable
technology from being forced on sex offenders as a condition of their
release. In fact, many of the statutes allow for technological advancement by requiring the use of GPS or other equivalent technolo244
gies. The courts will likely be forced, at some point, to consider the
propriety of sub-dermal GPS tracking device.
While the Schmerber Court allowed a forced test as a minimal infringement of individual’s bodily rights, the Supreme Court has already denied more intrusive methods of evidence-gathering. In Winston v. Lee, the Court considered a state’s effort to force a burglar to
undergo surgery for the removal of a bullet that would have almost
245
The Court held that “[a]
certainly provided evidence of his guilt.
compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security of such
magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to
246
produce evidence of a crime.”
The Court did leave the “reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin . . . [to be determined
247
by a] case-by-case approach.” This indicates that the Court’s determination ultimately comes down to a balancing test based on the in-

240

Implantable RFID and GPS Devices, FUTUREPUNDIT (May 26, 2003),
http://www.futurepundit.com/archives/001299.html.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. (noting the positive uses of avoidance of kidnapping and the benefits for
other “high-risk” situations).
244
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b)(1)(A) (2010) (allowing GPS device or
“other location tracking technology”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (2010) (allowing
GPS device “or other similar device”).
245
470 U.S. 753, 755–56 (1985).
246
Id. at 759.
247
Id. at 760.
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248

dividual circumstances of the search.
But the fact that Supreme
Court opposed the surgical removal of an item that evidenced an already committed crime indicates that the Court would likely be even
less sympathetic to allowing the implantation of a sub-dermal GPS
device when the device provides evidence for possible future crimes.
Even if the technological market develops internal GPS tracking devices, states should avoid using them for sex-offender tracking in order to stay within the bounds of Supreme Court precedent. In addition, each state’s statute should incorporate an explicit limitation to
the use of sub-dermal technology.
D. Freedom from Unreasonable Searches
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to limit the govern249
250
ment’s power and “to forever secure the people, their persons,
251
252
253
houses, papers and effects, against all unreasonable searches
254
and seizures under the guise of law.”
One of the most significant
arguments against the GPS-tracking statutes is that they violate the
255
Fourth Amendment by providing the police with the wearer’s location even when the person is constitutionally protected areas, such as
his home. This is an issue that the Supreme Court has considered in
detail although not within the direct circumstances of a sex-offender
tracking statute. In United States v. Katz, the Court decided that a key
tenet of Fourth Amendment analysis is that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
256
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”
Yet “what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
257
constitutionally protected.”
Katz dealt with the electronic eaves248

See, e.g., Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against
intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”).
249
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1171 (8th ed. 2004) (defining people as “the citizens
of a state as represented by the prosecution in a criminal case”).
250
Id. at 1178 (defining person as “the living body of a human being”).
251
Id. at 756 (defining house as “a home, dwelling, or residence”).
252
Id. at 1142 (defining paper as “any written or printed document or instrument”).
253
Id. at 554 (defining effects as “movable property” and “goods”).
254
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
255
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
256
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
257
Id.
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dropping of a suspect through a device attached to the exterior of a
258
phone booth. The Court held that Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy within the phone booth and that the government vio259
lated that right by collecting evidence without a warrant.
The Court did emphasize in Katz that a state entity may use an
electronic device “‘for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the . . . allegations’ of a ‘detailed factual affi260
davit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense.” A GPS
tracking device placed on a sex offender is not transmitting information pursuant to a warrant founded on probable cause. In addition, it transmits location information based on a possibility of some
future crime. A crime that has yet to be committed cannot meet the
Katz requirement for a warrant exception that such electronic infringement of a person’s expectation of privacy be based on a specific
criminal offense.
The Supreme Court has considered the use of electronic monitoring equipment to gather evidence against a criminal suspect in
other contexts as well. Two other cases concerning electronic moni261
toring of property are relevant to the tracking of a person’s body
because the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply not only to
262
a person’s effects, but also, if not more strictly, to his person.
The first case, United States v. Knotts, involved the use of an electronic “beeper” to track a drum of chloroform to the defendant’s
263
cabin where drug manufacturing was conducted.
The defendants
challenged the use of the beeper, which led to the discovery of incriminating evidence, as an infringement of their Fourth Amend264
ment rights. The majority opinion relied on the test articulated in
265
Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence.
This two-part test looks at (1)
“whether the individual, by his conduct, has ‘exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy’ . . . [and (2)] whether the indi-

258

Id. at 348.
Id. at 355–57.
260
Id. at 355 (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329–30 (1966))
(emphasis added).
261
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
262
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
263
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 280–81 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
259
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vidual’s subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is pre266
pared to recognize as “reasonable.’”
Under this test, the Court held that the defendants did not have
any reasonable expectation of privacy when the car carrying the drum
was driving on public roads not only because a person has a lesser
expectation of privacy while in an automobile but also because a per267
son’s location is in the public view. This allowed the admission of
all tracking information gathered while the truck was on the public
268
roadways. Once within private property, however, Knotts was entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy against any information
269
the beeper gave to the police. The Court noted that “[t]he right of
officers to thrust themselves into a home is also of grave concern, not
only to the individual, but to a society that chooses to dwell in rea270
sonable security and freedom from surveillance.”
Further, the Court in Knotts stated that “[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforce271
ment agent.” The Supreme Court has already held that the use of a
GPS tracking device on a person’s vehicle and the use of that device
to track the vehicle’s movement is a “search” under the Fourth
272
Amendment, and it is likely that this rationale would extend to a
device placed on a person’s body. Thus, when a sex-offender statute
requires imposition of electronic monitoring without individualized
risk assessment, it is the state legislators, rather than a judicial officer,
who are deciding that the individual’s rights must yield to a search.
Even if the wearing of a GPS tracking device is a search, however,
Knotts does not forbid the gathering of location information when
the offender is in a public area where his location is open to public
view. But using GPS tracking devices in private areas, on the other
hand, is much more problematic in light of the Court’s more recent
precedent.
United States v. Karo was the Court’s first case to specifically address whether an electronic monitoring device can provide evidence

266
267
268
269
270

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 281–82.
Id.
Id. at 282.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)) (emphasis add-

ed).
271
272

Id. (emphasis added).
United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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273

when used in a protected area. In Karo, DEA agents placed an electronic beeper in a can of ether with the consent of the can’s owner
274
and pursuant to court authorization.
The agents then proceeded
to track the can of ether after Karo picked it up and brought it into
275
his house.
Using the beeper technology, the agents continued to
track the can of ether as it was moved to another defendant’s house,
276
and eventually to a commercial storage facility.
Although none of
the information obtained while the beeper was in public view violated
the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights, the Court held that “the
monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to
visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those
277
who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”
The basic principle reaffirmed in Karo is that “private residences
are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifia278
ble.”
Such searches are “presumptively unreasonable absent exi279
Even more relevant to this Comment, the
gent circumstances.”
Court rejected the Government’s argument “that it should be completely free from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment to determine by means of an electronic device, without a warrant and without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a particular article—or a person, for that matter—is in an individual’s home at a par280
ticular time.”
Recently, the Court applied this principle specifically to the use
281
of GPS technology in United States v. Jones.
In Jones, the Court decided “whether the attachment of a [GPS] tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure
282
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” The government
argued that attaching a GPS device to the exterior of Jones’s Jeep,

273

468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id. at 714.
278
Id.
279
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748–49
(1984)).
280
Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
281
132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012).
282
Id. at 948.
274
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which was constantly in public view, is not a search under the Fourth
283
Amendment.
The Court disagreed, holding that “[b]y attaching
284
the device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area.”
Even though this decision deals with a GPS device placed on a vehicle
and not a person, the case extends the Court’s previous Fourth
285
Amendment precedents to GPS-tracking technology.
When a sex offender enters his home, or another private area,
286
the tracking device continues to reveal his location. The Supreme
Court has explicitly stated that such monitoring, in areas where the
offender has a reasonable expectation of privacy, violates the Fourth
287
Amendment “absent exigent circumstances.”
The exigent circumstances required for an exception to the court’s ruling in Karo simply
do not apply when an offender is going to be tracked for an extended
period of time under a sex-offender-tracking statute. When the government receives location data from a tracking device while the
wearer is in a protected area, such as his home, it is a violation of the
wearer’s Fourth Amendment rights.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR CONSTITUTIONALITY
As shown in Part III, there are a few major arguments against the
288
New technoloconstitutionality of sex-offender tracking statutes.
gies, such as GPS tracking devices, are testing the fundamental protections of the Constitution in ways that the Framers never could have
envisioned. Until the Supreme Court reviews this new area of statu289
tory development specifically, courts and circuits throughout the
country will be entitled to independently decide whether to uphold
such laws. This is a difficult decision because, notwithstanding the
various arguments that attack the constitutionality of sex-offender
tracking, there are also various legal arguments to defend the constitutionality of such statutes. Part IV will address some of the strongest
justifications for the constitutionality of sex-offender tracking statutes
283

Id. at 952.
Id.
285
Id. at 951–52.
286
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16981(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2006) (setting a minimum standard
for any state requesting a federal grant for setting up a sex offender monitoring program to utilize a device that “permit[s] active, real-time, and continuous monitoring
of offenders 24 hours a day”).
287
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–15.
288
See discussion supra Part III.
289
The Court’s holding in Jones is limited to the placement of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle and does not directly address sex-offender GPS-tracking statutes. See
supra notes 281–85 and accompanying text.
284
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and review the counter-arguments to the arguments discussed in Part
III.
Part IV.A will review the argument that, since the Fourth
290
Amendment only applies to unreasonable searches and seizures, it
does not apply to sex-offender tracking statutes at all because they are
a reasonable application of government authority. Part IV.B will review restrictions of rights based on a judgment that an individual is a
“danger to society” and how such precedent is applicable given the
danger that sex offenders pose to society. Finally, Part IV.C will review the argument that because probationers and parolees have reduced rights due to their prior crimes, especially when dealing with
searches that would not otherwise be constitutional, none of the arguments analyzed in Part III apply to sex-offender-tracking statutes.
A. Sex-Offender Tracking is a Reasonable Search Under the Fourth
Amendment
One of the most significant arguments against the constitutionality of these searches asserts that such constant location monitoring
291
violates the offender’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Even assuming
that using the information from an active tracking device to verify an
offender’s location within his residence is a search under the Fourth
Amendment, such searches may not violate the Fourth Amendment if
292
the court determines that the intrusion is “reasonable.”
Although
the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that “searches and seizures
293
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable,”
the Court has also found in various cases that “because the ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the war294
rant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.”
The Court has
gone on to find that “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth
Amendment . . . ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justi295
Although the Fourth Amendment generally refy [the] action.’”
quires a warrant for searches of a person’s home, under the standard
articulated in United States v. Knights, “a lesser degree satisfies the

290

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
292
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
293
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
294
Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 (quoting Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13
(1999)).
295
Id. at 404 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (emphasis added)).
291
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Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests
296
makes such a standard reasonable.”
Given the strong government interest in protecting children
from sexual predators, there is a compelling argument that the government interest outweighs the individual’s privacy interests when
sex-offender tracking statutes are in question. This type of legislation
attempts to monitor sex offenders after they are released from jail;
thus the primary purpose of sex-offender tracking statutes is to “best
297
protect the public from the risk that the individual will reoffend.”
GPS tracking can only be implemented on someone who has already
committed a sexual crime because there would be no way to identify
a sex offender before he has committed a sex crime. Because of this,
electronic monitoring is completely focused on the risk of recidivism
and the fear that registration alone does not protect society sufficient298
ly. Thus, the Knights balancing test requires an examination whether the government’s interest in reducing sex-offender recidivism is
299
warranted when compared to the recidivism threat of other crimes.
An individual risk assessment of a sex offender is a rather inexact
science; the best available indicators of recidivism risks are statistical
300
models that provide data on general groupings of sex offenders.
Such statistics can differ depending on a wide range of variables, but
referring to the statistics that the judicial system uses is valuable because probably similar statistics will be utilized under any “reasonableness” analysis of the government interest. The most recent sexoffender recidivism study was conducted by the U.S. Department of
Justice and the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2003, and followed 9,691
male sex offenders that were released in 1994 by fifteen different
301
states. This is the most recent government study on recidivism and
302
various courts have cited it.
296

534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-174.03(3) (2011).
298
See, e.g., Memmott, supra, note 13 (discussing how the rape and murder of Jessica Lunsford by a registered sex offender raised the issue that sex offender registration is insufficient to protect children, leading directly to the passing of sex-offender
tracking statutes).
299
See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
300
But see discussion infra Part V.E (arguing that risk assessment is still necessary to
ensure that the threat a sex offender poses actually justifies GPS tracking without violating his due process rights.).
301
PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF SEX
OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 1 (2003), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
302
See, e.g., United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1215 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing the
Langan report to justify overturning an unreasonably light sentence for a sex offend297
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The report divides “sex offenders” into the categories of “rapists”
and “sexual assaulters,” but all 9,691 sex offenders included in the
303
This group correreport were considered “violent sex offenders.”
sponds to the offenders who would be liable under the GPS-tracking
304
statutes of many states as posing the worst sex-offender threat. The
chance that a sex-offender would be rearrested or reconvicted for any
crime within three years of his release in 1994 was forty-three percent
305
and twenty-four percent, respectively. These percentages may seem
very high, but when compared to the non-sex offender control group,
in which sixty-eight percent of the members were rearrested and forty-eight percent were reconvicted, the recidivism threat for sex offenders is much lower than the recidivism threat for non-sex offend306
ers.
According to the report, even though the re-arrest or reconviction rates for any crime may be less than rates for non-sex offenders,
the threat that a sex offender will commit a sexual crime within three
years of release is actually much higher than the threat of a non-sex
307
offender committing such crimes. One thing to consider is that the
study is limited to comparing sex offenders and non-sex offenders for
a period of only three years after release, which may just indicate that
sex offenders wait longer than three years after release to commit
new sex offenses. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that out of
the sex-offender control group, prior to their incarceration, 28.5%
had at least one arrest for a sex offense and 10.3% had at least one
308
arrest for a sex offense committed against a child.
This seems to
justify the “government’s interest” that causes the authorities to focus
on sex offenders as a specific threat that needs to be addressed in
unique ways—namely, that they will commit new sex crimes long after
they have served their time.
The Supreme Court has yet to address a sex-offender case in
which this specific report has been cited, but the Court has relied on
similar data in the past. When the Court granted certiorari to review
sex-offender registration requirements in Smith, the Court based its
er); United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 641–42 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing the
Langan report to justify overturning a sex offender’s thirty-year ban from using a
computer as too severe).
303
LANGAN ET AL., supra note 301, at 3.
304
See discussion supra Part II.
305
LANGAN ET AL., supra note 301, at 13 tbl.7.
306
Id. at 14.
307
See id. at 24 tbl.21 (showing that 5.3% of sex offenders were rearrested for a sex
offense, in comparison to 1.3% of non-sex offenders).
308
Id. at 11 tbl.5.
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ruling, at least in part, on a previous study by the Department of Justice, which stated that “[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be
309
rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” The Court found that
Alaska’s conclusion that “conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of recidivism” was consistent with the “grave
concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex of310
fenders and their dangerousness as a class.”
Although not citing
specific statistics, in 2003 the Supreme Court conclusively found that
“[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is frightening and
311
high.”
Therefore, the Supreme Court may very well find that the
reduction of this risk is a serious “government interest” that can
counter the Fourth Amendment challenges presented against GPS312
tracking statutes, at least in part.
B. Reduced Rights Because Sex Offenders Are a “Danger to Society”
If the Supreme Court was correct in 2003 and sex offenders pose
a recidivism risk that makes them more dangerous than other criminals, then the general rights of sex offenders could be reduced for
the greater good of society. Although the Supreme Court has yet to
review the constitutionality of GPS-tracking statutes, the Court has
upheld the constitutionality of civil- and involuntary-commitment
statutes that allow criminals or sex offenders who are still deemed to
be a threat to society to be detained after completing their prison
313
sentences. Thus, it is a strong argument that GPS-tracking statutes
are less invasive than involuntary- and civil-commitment statutes that
are already declared constitutional because the infringements discussed in Part III pale in comparison to restraining someone in a
mental hospital or another government facility against his will.
Civil and involuntary commitment represents the most invasive
reduction of the rights of individuals who represent “dangers to soci309

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33
(2002))(internal quotation marks omitted).
310
Id.
311
Id. (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 34) (internal quotation marks omitted).
312
See discussion supra Part III.D.
313
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding the constitutionality
of Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01–29a22 (2009),
which is the strictest sex-offender civil-commitment statute in the country);
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (upholding the constitutionality of involuntary commitment of those individuals with mental illness who are shown to be a
danger to themselves or others). It is important to note that these statutes required
an individualized risk assessment before they could be applied.
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ety” because these proceedings literally take away an individual’s right
to be free from custody even when his sentence has finished or when
he has not committed a crime at all. The Supreme Court has agreed
with the common law at times that, where “one who takes charge of a
third person is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control
that person to prevent him from causing reasonably foreseeable bodi314
ly harm to others.”
It is under this rationale—that the authorities
should not release back into society anyone who is deemed a threat—
315
that civil and involuntary commitment were born.
Involuntary commitment and civil commitment are different
types of restraints, and therefore they are address separately. Involuntary commitment tends to refer to confinement in a mental hospi316
tal against one’s will.
The Supreme Court set the national guidelines for involuntary commitment in O’Connor v. Donaldson where it
held that a state may not confine someone against his will if he is not
317
dangerous to himself or others. The flip side of this ruling is that a
state has every right to hold someone against his will if he is found to
be a danger to himself or others upon release. Donaldson was committed for paranoid schizophrenia by his father against his will and
spent fifteen years confined in an institution because the Florida laws
at the time required involuntary commitment for anyone deemed
318
“mentally incompetent. As soon as a jury determined that he could
be released back into society without posing a danger to himself or
others, his mental illness became irrelevant; the state could no longer
319
hold him because its “government interest” in keeping the “harmless mentally ill” away from the public could no longer outweigh the
320
rights of the individual.
Involuntary commitment is also allowed as an alternative to releasing a prisoner at the end of his prison term if he is deemed to be
321
a threat to society. Congress has passed legislation that protects the
314
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1961 (2010) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1963)).
315
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2011) (justifying civil commitment of “sexually
violent predators” due to “the dangers they present.”).
316
See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 564–65 (illustrating a challenge by a patient who was
civilly confined in a mental hospital for fifteen years against his will).
317
Id. at 573–74 (specifying that mental illness alone is not enough for a state to
involuntarily commit someone to a mental institution).
318
Id. at 566–67.
319
For a discussion of the balancing between “government interest” and Fourth
Amendment rights, see discussion supra Part.IV.A.1 .
320
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 574–75.
321
See 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2006).
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public from a criminal who is due for release, but is “suffering from
322
mental disease or defect.
Even though the individual might have
served his complete sentence, if courts believe “his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
323
damage to property of another,” “the court shall commit the person
324
to the custody of the Attorney General.” There is no more fundamental right than to be free from physical restraint. But even this
right is secondary to the interest of society if the person is shown to
be a threat to others.
Civil commitment is a more recent concept that applies specifically to sex offenders who are held beyond their initial sentence be325
cause of their individual risk of recidivism. For example, the Kansas
legislature found that “existing civil commitment procedures . . . are
inadequate to address the special needs of sexually violent predators
and the risks they present to society” and enacted a separate statutory
process to keep sex offenders behind bars for as long as they posed a
threat due to a showing of “mental abnormality or personality disor326
der.”
The first sex offender who was committed under the act,
Leroy Hendricks, was originally convicted for “taking indecent liber327
After nearly ten years of his senties with two 13-year-old boys.”
tence had passed, the state filed a petition to keep Hendricks under
civil commitment right before his scheduled release because he was a
328
habitual child molester and posed a high threat of recidivism.
Hendricks challenged his commitment and the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act ultimately receiving a grant of certiorari by the U.S.
329
Supreme Court.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas statute on
various grounds, clarifying that even though freedom of bodily restraint from arbitrary government action is at the core of due process,
322

Id.
§ 4246(a) (emphasis added).
324
§ 4246(d).
325
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350–51 (1997).
326
§ 59-29a01. “Mental abnormality” is defined as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to
the health and safety of others. Id. § 59-29a02. Thus, if an individualized risk assessment finds that a sex offender has a high risk of reoffending, that would likely
qualify as a “mental abnormality” under the Kansas Act.
327
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
328
Id. at 354–55.
329
Id. at 350, 354; Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S.Ct. 2522, 2522 (1996) (granting certiorari).
323
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it is not an absolute right. The Court found that the right to be free
from bodily restraint is subject to “manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good” and “[o]n any
other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its mem331
bers.”
The Court rejected the argument that “mental illness,” as
opposed to “mental abnormality” prerequisite that Kansas statute incorporated, should be a prerequisite for any involuntary commitment
and that the Kansas statute’s focus on the dangerousness of the indi332
vidual satisfied due process.
The right to be free from restraint is one of the most cherished
liberties that the Constitution bestows upon American citizens, but
this right comes secondary to the safety of society when the individual
is deemed to be dangerous in a way that cannot be controlled outside
of custody. Although the GPS-tracking statutes are extremely invasive
on the sex offender’s rights to move freely, control his own body, or
333
be free from unreasonable searches, it is very likely that the Supreme Court, which has upheld the constitutionality of civil commit334
ment, would also find constitutional the curtailment of other constitutional rights based on an individualized assessment that the
person in question poses a continued danger to society.
C. Diminished Rights of Parolees or Probationers
An additional argument supporting the constitutionality of sexoffender tracking is that most of the sex-offender-tracking statutes on335
336
ly apply to offenders while they are on parole, probation, or un337
der community supervision, where the rights of the released offenders are not at their full pre-conviction level. It is important to
note that probation, which typically refers to an alternative sentence

330

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
Id. at 356–57 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26
(1905))(internal quotation marks omitted).
332
Id. at 360.
333
See discussion supra Parts III.B–D.
334
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350–51.
335
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004 (West 2007) (requiring electronic monitoring
for sex offenders who are “released on parole” (emphasis added)).
336
See, e.g., MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 265, § 47 (2006) (establishing electronic monitoring “as a requirement of any term of probation” (emphasis added)).
337
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(3) (West 2010) (requiring electronic monitoring for certain sex offenders who are “placed on probation or community control”
(emphasis added)).
331
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that does not involve any prison time, can have a very different
meaning in the context of to sex offenders, who may be placed on
probation for extended periods of time even after serving jail time.
For example, the Florida law states that periods of probation shall not
339
exceed two years generally, but periods of probation for sex offend340
ers can continue for decades after incarceration.
As more states
341
enact harsh mandatory prison sentences for sex offenders, the
terms of probation, parole, and community supervision tend to mean
the same thing: if a sex offender ever gets out of prison, the state will
watch him for decades or for life.
With regard to parolees generally, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that “the Fourth Amendment does not render the
342
States powerless to address . . . concerns [of recidivism] effectively.”
Because probationers, and implicitly parolees, pose a higher risk of
recidivism, a state can “justifiably focus on probationers in a way that
343
it does not on the ordinary citizen.” Thus, even though a police officer would not be able to walk up to a citizen and search him for
contraband or search his apartment for evidence of illegal activity,
the Supreme Court authorized such searches of parolees in Samson v.
California and of probationers in Knights, respectively.
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Samson, “a State has an
overwhelming interest in supervising parolees because parolees . . .
344
are more likely to commit future criminal offenses.” Because most
sex-offender tracking statutes either have limited scope to the term of
probation, parole, or community supervision, or mandate lifetime
probation for certain crimes, sex offenders’ rights are not at their full

338
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1240 (8th ed. 2004) (defining probation as “[a]
court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to stated conditions, releases a convicted person into the community instead of sending the criminal to jail or prison”).
339
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.04 (West 2011).
340
See, e.g., Honrine v. McNeil, No. 5:07cv227/MCR/EMT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128271, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2009) (discussing a plea agreement for sexual battery on a child that consisted of two years community supervision and twenty years of
probation); Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 805 (Fla. 2008) (discussing a plea
agreement for three counts of lewd or lascivious battery and exhibition on a child
under the age of sixteen that included 364 days of prison time, two years of community supervision, and eight years on probation).
341
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 750.520b(2) (LexisNexis 2011) (setting the
mandatory prison term for “criminal sexual conduct in the first degree” between
twenty-five years and lifetime without parole).
342
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 854 (2006).
343
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).
344
Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S.
357, 365 (1998)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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pre-conviction level. It is likely that the Supreme Court will approve
some type of diminished constitutional protections for sex offenders
because of their previous crimes, provided that the laws that curtail
those protections were in place before the crime was committed to
give constructive notice to an offender about the possible conse345
quences of his actions.
V. FINDING THE PROPER BALANCE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND
FEDERAL STATUTES
The proper balance between the rights of a sex offender who
has served his sentence and the right of the government to protect
the public from the risk of recidivism has not yet been decided, but at
some point the Supreme Court will be asked to review the various arguments on both sides. Nothing is certain, but Supreme Court precedent on issues at least comparable to the long-term or lifetime GPS
tracking of sex offenders provides insight into the Court’s likely de346
termination. This Part will list the various conclusions that can be
drawn from Court precedent with regard to statutes currently in
force, and how they should be amended based on constitutional
principles.
A. Limited GPS-Tracking of Sex Offenders is Likely Constitutional
First and foremost, this Comment concludes that GPS-tracking
of sex offenders can be brought within the bounds of the Constitu347
tion. The recidivism threat that sex offenders pose is real, and GPStracking statutes are less restrictive than other statutes that have already been upheld. The Supreme Court has already held in Hendricks that a state may implement a statute that subjects a postincarceration sex offender to civil commitment if he is deemed to be
348
a threat to himself due to a mental abnormality. Any sex offender
who shows a predisposition to committing such crimes would be considered “mentally abnormal” under the Kansas Act and would be eli349
gible for civil commitment. Taking away a person’s freedom is the
most invasive infringement of constitutional rights that a government
can impose on an individual, but such actions have already been held

345
346
347
348
349

See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Parts III–IV.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See supra text accompanying note 328.
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constitutional when a person is a “danger to society.”
GPS-tracking
statutes undeniably infringe on offender’s’ rights, but these infringements are still less severe than civil commitment, which has al351
ready been held constitutional.
Thus, the limited GPS-tracking of
sex offenders can also be constitutional with a showing that these individuals have a predisposition for committing such crimes. Furthermore, the Court in Hendricks held that safeguards, such as the
ones in the Kansas civil-commitment statute, and determination
based on narrow individual circumstances were within the Court’s
352
“understanding of ordered liberty.”
Therefore, if GPS-tracking
statutes are written and applied in way that would fit within the
Court’s “understanding of ordered liberty,” such government action
would likely be held constitutional. As the statutes stand right now,
some changes are necessary to reach that point.
B. Retroactive Application Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
In order for sex-offender GPS tracking statutes to be held constitutional, they should not be applied to crimes that were committed
353
before the statutes’ effective dates.
In Smith, the Supreme Court
held that registration requirements, and the dissemination of sexoffender information to the public, constituted a civil regulatory
scheme and were not punitive in nature, which would have made the
354
Ex Post Facto Clause applicable. With GPS-tracking of sex offenders, however, the states are imposing requirements on sex offenders
that go far beyond the mere dissemination of information to the
355
community. Although registration may make offenders’ lives more
difficult, GPS-tracking is a constant infringement on the offenders’
356
freedom of movement, bodily integrity from unreasonable govern350

See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
352
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997). The Court reached this conclusion, in part, because Kansas’s civil-commitment statute was based on three different
individualized risk assessments conducted prior to commitment, which also had
three different avenues for review: (1) an annual review of the detention by the
court, (2) ability by the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services to end the
commitment at any time if the offender’s dangerousness has changed, and (3) the
availability of a release petition, which the committed offender could file a at any
time. Id. at 353.
353
See discussion supra Part III.A.
354
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003).
355
See Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196–97 (Mass. 2009) (explaining
that a lifetime GPS-tracking requirement is “dramatically more intrusive and burdensome” than registration only).
356
See discussion supra Part III.B.
351
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358

ment intrusion, and freedom from unreasonable searches.
The
Supreme Court has repeatedly used the Mendoza-Martinez factors to
decide whether a statute is punitive, in which case the Ex Post Facto
Clause would forbid retroactive application, or a civil-regulatory
359
scheme, in which case retroactive application is allowed. When reviewing the effect of GPS-tracking statutes under the Mendoza-Martinez
test, the GPS-tracking statutes fall much more on the punitive side of
360
Therefore, this Comment
the equation than registration laws do.
finds that any retroactive application of sex-offender GPS-tracking
laws is unconstitutional.
C. Technology Utilized Should Be as Minimally Invasive as Possible
Any technology that the states use to track the location and
movement of sex offenders should infringe as little as possible on the
361
individual’s bodily integrity.
When reviewing limitations on a person’s bodily integrity, the Court has already stated that it will take into
account whether the limitations are justified in the circumstances or
362
whether they are made in an improper manner. Even though the
Supreme Court may find that the limited GPS-tracking of sex offenders is justified after balancing the offender’s individual rights against
the government’s interest in protecting society against sex-offender
363
recidivism, there still need to be safeguards in place to ensure that
the offender’s rights are not infringed more than is absolutely necessary. In order to protect those rights, the states should use the smallest, least visible tracking devices that are practical to obtain necessary
364
information under the statutes.
Technology is improving, and as
the technology becomes more reliable and less noticeable, the state
should safeguard an offender’s mobility by ensuring that the GPS
tracking device will not evolve into a “modern-day scarlet letter,” exposing the offender to public ridicule, fear, or hostility any time he
leaves his home.
If the technology that a state uses malfunctions frequently, resulting in incessant threats of an arrest to an offender who has done
nothing wrong, then the state should consider using more reliable
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364

See discussion supra Part III.C.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
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365

tracking devices.
If, as public awareness of such tracking statutes
increases, the state determines that the utilized device is too visible
and instantly exposes the wearer to public condemnation, then the
state should examine whether or not a smaller device, or perhaps one
that can be worn underneath clothing and still transmit required lo366
cation data, should be adopted. In addition, if a state requires notification and approval before a sex offender leave the state, the state
needs to establish an efficient procedure to ensure that the wait for
such approval is not unreasonably long as to make interstate travel
367
that complies within the law impractical.
Finally, even if technology evolves to the point where implantable sub-dermal devices become viable, states should never use them
for the tracking of sex offenders, and state statutes should specifically
368
authorize only the use of external devices.
Using sub-dermal implants to track sex offenders is much more intrusive and should not
be used when less-invasive means are available to achieve the same
369
end. Since the ultimate decision on this issue will come down to a
balancing the infringement of the individual’s rights against the
needs of the state to address with sex-offender recidivism, each state
should use the least visible and stigmatizing external devices available
to reduce public condemnation and limit the intrusiveness of the
370
GPS device as much as possible.
D. Tracking in Protected Areas Violates the Fourth Amendment
Any evidence obtained from a GPS tracking device while the offender is in a protected area where there is a legitimate expectation
371
of privacy should explicitly be inadmissible against the offender.
The tracking devices that sex offenders continuously wear provide
the police with information about their location that can ultimately
372
be used as evidence.
When a sex offender is in the public view,
such location information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment
373
under the Supreme Court’s holding in Katz.
Anyone can see the
offender’s location when he is at the store, sitting in a baseball stadi365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373

See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
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um, or driving on a highway, so the offender does not have a reason374
able expectation of privacy in these areas.
Likewise, the Fourth
Amendment protections do not apply in areas in which, by court order or statute, the offender has been forbidden to go, such as near
375
the victim’s residence or near a grade school. When the GPS tracking device is transmitting from areas where even a sex offender has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, however, such as his home or another private property, the state should not obtain location-based ev376
idence that it would not otherwise be able to obtain legally.
In sum, in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Karo, statutes should specifically limit the use of evidence from GPS
trackers to evidence obtained in public areas or excluded zones
where the sex offender does not have a reasonable expectation of
377
Ideally, tracking devices would not provide any location
privacy.
data while the offender is within a protected area, but programming
a device to recognize the difference between a public area and a protected area for each individual offender is not an efficient use of state
resources. Instead, the recommended option is for the state to explicitly assert in the statute that any location data will not be utilized if
the police would not have been constitutionally permitted to obtain
378
such information without the tracker. For example, while an active
tracking device will continue to transmit the offender’s location even
when he is home, protected under the Fourth Amendment, the main
threat to the individual is that such data will be used against him in a
379
court of law.
If a state establishes that such evidence from private
areas will be excluded per se under the state’s tracking statute, the infringement of the individual’s Fourth Amendment protections will be
380
reduced.
E. GPS Tracking Without Individualized Risk Assessment is
Unconstitutional
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, any decision to impose
GPS-tracking on a sex offender needs to be based on an individualized risk assessment and not, as most statutes are currently written,

374
375
376
377
378
379
380

See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
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381

based on the crime committed. One of the main reasons that the
Court upheld Kansas’s civil-commitment statute in Hendricks was that
the statute ensured that every civilly committed individual was actually a danger to society due to a mental abnormality and that this issue
382
could not be resolved otherwise.
The current majority of statutes,
including the Florida, California, and Massachusetts Models, impose
GPS-tracking requirements on entire classes of sex offenders based
383
on the crime committed.
Without safeguards in place to ensure
that a particular individual actually does pose enough of a danger to
society to justify tracking his location and movement, a statutory
scheme does not fall under the Court’s “understanding of ordered
liberty” and will not be granted the same constitutional leeway that
384
the Kansas civil-commitment statute received.
VI. A PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TRACKING OF
SEX OFFENDERS
Though the current statutory models for the GPS-tracking of sex
offenders do not properly balance the rights of post-incarceration sex
offenders with the government’s interest in protecting the public
from sex-offender recidivism, there are ways to bring the two oppos385
ing interests into balance.
Below, this Comment provides the text
of a model statute that illustrates how legislators can draft GPStracking legislation to survive constitutional review. This model statute is a combination of provisions of various GPS-tracking statutes
that are already in effect. Any state can tailor this Model Statute to
address the crimes that the state would like to cover, the expense it
wishes to bare in such a tracking program, and the GPS tracking devices it wishes to use.
Model Sex-Offender Tracking Statute
Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to protect the public generally, and children
specifically, from the threat of recidivism that Sexually Violent Predators and
Child Sexual Predators can pose when released from incarceration. In addition to registration requirements and other restrictions that are applicable to
sex offenders in this jurisdiction, this Act allows for the GPS tracking of those

381
382
383
384
385

See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
See Kan. v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352–53 (1997).
See discussion supra Parts II.A–C.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See discussion supra Part V.A–E.
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Violent Sex Offenders who pose the highest risk of recidivism and are the greatest dangers to society. The purpose of such tracking is both to serve as a deterrent for future crimes effectively and to ensure that Violent Sex Offenders do
not enter prohibited Exclusion Zones, where the risk of re-offense is heightener.
Definitions: As Used in This Act:
1. “Child Sexual Predator” is a person who was previously convicted of
a violent sex crime and is predisposed to commit such sex crimes against children in the future because he or she has a mental disorder or abnormality that
has been verified by a licensed doctor or psychologist or because he or she has a
history of committing crimes that indicate an ongoing lustful predisposition
toward children, as determined by a Court upon review of evidence from what386
ever source is deemed relevant.
2. “Conviction” means that there was either (a) a judgment or determi387
nation of guilt at trial, or (b) a guilty or nolo contendere plea.
388
3. “Court” means a judicial district court of this jurisdiction.
4. “Exclusion Zone” is any zone in which a person wearing a GPS
tracking device is prohibited from going, unless the person is merely travelling
389
through the zone in order to reach another location.
5. “GPS Tracking” means the tracking through the use of any GPS
Tracking Device that identifies a person’s location and actively reports or rec390
ords such information.
6. “GPS Tracking Device” is any device that identifies a person’s location and actively reports or records such information. It includes any compa391
rable technology that is worn externally on the offender’s person.
7. “Judicial Determination” is a decision by the Court that a person is or
continues to be a Child Sexual Criminal or a Violent Sex Criminal as defined
392
by this Act.
8. “Mental Abnormality” is an acquired or congenital condition that affects the volitional or emotional of a person in any way that predisposes the
person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a way that makes the per393
son a danger to the safety or health of other people.

386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1(1) (2011).
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-23(a) (West 2011).
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1(2) (2011).
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.48(1)(a) (West 2011).
See id. § 301.48(1)(b).
See id. § 301.48(1)(b).
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.1(3) (2011).
See id. § 15:560.1(4).
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9. “Sexually Violent Criminal” means an offender who has been convicted of a Violent Sex Offense and who has a Mental Abnormality or antisocial
personality disorder that makes the offender likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses as determined by the Court upon receipt and review of
394
information from whatever source the Court deems relevant.
10. “Violent Sex Crime” is:
a. A Conviction for any of the following crimes:
(i) Rape;
(ii) Aggravated Rape;
(iii) Sexual battery;
(iv) Battery;
(v) Sexual exploitation of a child;
(vi) Aggravated sexual exploitation of a child;
(vii) Statutory rape;
(ix) Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a child;
(x) Rape of a child;
(xi) Incest;
(xii) Solicitation of a child;
(xi) Sexual battery by an authority figure.
b. A Conviction for attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any offense listed in subdivision (a) of this section.
c. A Conviction for being an accessory after the fact, or criminal responsibility for facilitating the commission of any offense listed in subdivision (a)
395
of this section.
Applicability of the Act.
1. When a Court is initially sentencing a person convicted of any Violent Sex Crime, the Court may impose GPS-tracking as a condition of release
following any period of incarceration if there is a Judicial Determination that
the person being sentenced is either a Sexually Violent Criminal or a Child
Sexual Criminal under this Act, and thus a danger to society. The Court may
establish the length of such tracking based on the individual risk assessment of
the person, the length of probation, parole, or community supervision as required by law, or, if the law is silent, whatever length of supervision that the
Court deems just and proper based on the individual circumstances of the person being sentenced.
2. When a person who has been Convicted of any Violent Sex Crime is to
be released back into society on probation, parole, or community supervision,
394
395

See id. § 15:560.1(5).
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-301(2) (West 2011).
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the supervising authorities may make a motion to the Court to impose GPStracking on that person as a condition of release. The Court may impose such
monitoring conditions if it has been shown that the person is either a Sexually
Violent Criminal or a Child Sexual Criminal under this Act, and thus a danger to society. The Court may establish the length of such tracking based upon
the individual risk assessment of the person, the length of probation, parole, or
community supervision as required by law, or, if the law is silent, whatever
length of supervision that the Court deems just and proper based upon the individual circumstances of the person being released.
3. When the Court is sentencing a person convicted of any Violent Sex
Crime for a violation of his or her probation, parole, or community supervision, the Court may impose GPS-tracking as a condition of release following
any period of incarceration if it has been shown that the person sentenced is
either a Sexually Violent Criminal or a Child Sexual Criminal under this Act,
and thus a danger to society. The Court may establish the length of such
tracking based on the individual risk assessment of the person and his or her
history of violating previous conditions of release. Such a period of GPStracking may be imposed for any period up to, and including, the person’s
natural life in response to a violation of probation, parole, or conditional release.
Limitations of the Act
1. The location data gathered from a GPS tracking device is only admissible against the offender in a court of law if the data was not taken while the
person was in a place or area where he or she has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, such as within his or her home or curtilage. Location data is admissible against the offender if the data was taken while the offender was in a
public place, Exclusion Zone, or other area where the offender does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
2. This Act may only be applied based on an individualized risk assessment, and not solely on the crime committed or any other generalized risk assessment that looks beyond the individual in question.
3. This Act may only be applied on those offenders who have committed
their offense or violation of probation, parole, or community supervision on or
after the effective date. Any retroactive application is prohibited.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Not all sex-offender statutes are unconstitutional, but the majority of statutes currently in force require adjustments. Unlike registration requirements, which merely notify members of the public of a
possible threat in their neighborhoods, the primary result of sexoffender tracking statutes is to perpetually gather evidence against a

DANTE_ FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 10:51 AM

COMMENT

1227

sex offender for crimes that may happen. The punitive nature of lifetime electronic monitoring, while possibly serving the public interest,
is a serious infringement on an individual’s freedoms in a variety of
ways, and legislators should take measures to better balance an individual offender’s rights with the interests of the public. This Comment has offered one possibility for restoring the balance between
the rights of the offender and the security interest of society, but this
is not the only to reach such a balance. In the end, it is for the Supreme Court to determine the correct balance, but resolving this issue may take years or even decades. In the mean time, states should
use the ideas developed this Comment to bring current GPS-tracking
statutes more in line with Supreme Court precedent.

